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2REVISITING THE ROLE OF THE FUTURE 
IN ACCOUNTING REFORM
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Abstract
Overlooked in accounting-reform debate emanating from recent financial 
reporting scandals is the role of forward-looking disclosure inaugurated in the late 1970s 
and expanded throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  Debate centered on whether accounting 
concepts developed during this period were too rule-bound.  An SEC study largely 
resolved this debate by characterizing US GAAP as a mix of rules and principles
embedded in an objectives-based accounting system.  The SEC expressed a slight 
preference for principles over rules in future accounting standard-setting.  Some see this 
resolution as transformative.  This Article considers how it may disguise a false 
dichotomy likely providing false catharsis.  Underappreciated are the terms of a debate 
intense in the 1960s and 1970s but quiescent amid modernity’s preoccupation with the 
future: the reliability of forward-looking disclosure.  This Article revisits that debate and
the regime’s contributions to financial-fraud risk, showing how contemporary 
accounting’s role has been recast from providing credible numerical history to quixotic
narrative prognosis due to pressures from the information age, digitization era and 
modern finance theory.  It is too late and unrealistic to repeal forward-looking 
disclosure, but short-sighted to overlook its contributions to systemic financial-
misstatement risk.
Keywords: accounting theory, accounting reform, forward-looking disclosure, 
projections, digitization, information, modernity, culture, future, rules-based, principles-
based, code-based, objectives-based, natural language, false dichotomies, fairly presents, 
historical cost, fair value, cash accounting, accrual accounting, narrative financial 
disclosure, continuous disclosure system, transparency, early warning system, modern 
finance theory, presentiation.
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3INTRODUCTION
Contemporary debates in accounting reform ignited by sizable financial frauds 
overlooked the role of forward-looking disclosure, which this Article revisits. The 
framework for debating diagnosis and reform was based on false dichotomies arising 
from a tendency to blame failures on structures rather than attitudes.1 The frauds were not 
due to whether accounting concepts are embedded in a rules-based framework rather than 
a principles-based framework and had little do with whether there is a difference between 
complying with accounting concepts and presenting financial information fairly.
Deeper difficulties reside in ravenous appetites for speed and transparency stoked 
by digitization.2 Traditional accounting is incapable of sating these desires. 
Contemporary pressures from digitization and information-hunger force a system 
designed to provide primarily numerical histories into one needing to provide narrative 
prognosis.  The frauds likely were more proximately caused by demand for information 
about the future, which simply does not exist.  Forward-looking statements possess 
intrinsic risk of exaggeration, the core of fraud, and hence disappointment, its 
manifestation.  
Pursuing the balance in this appetite-capacity mix is more promising than 
haggling about rules versus principles or accounting-compliance versus fair -presentation, 
the false dichotomies that dominated public discourse in frauds’ wake. An important 
aspect of this mix is the balance between accounting as numerical history and accounting 
as narrative prognosis.3
Part I shows how two inter-related debates engendered by recent accounting 
frauds met dead-ends. One concerned whether compliance with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) facilitates financial statements providing a fair 
presentation or whether departing from GAAP is necessary. This hinged, in turn, upon 
1 See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 
(1981) (outlining process of moving from assigning responsibilities not to individuals or 
groups of people but instead using a systems-based approach to organizational behavior).
2 See J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent 
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERK. TECH. L.J. 793, 
812 (1999) (“The near-complete digitization of data collection, manipulation, and 
dissemination over the past thirty years has ushered in what many regard as the 
transparency revolution”).
3
  The theme evokes an old joke about the economist seen searching a parking lot under a 
street light.  Asked what he is doing, the economist says he is looking for his car keys.  
Prodded as to where he lost them, he replies, “way over there.”  So why are you looking 
here, he’s asked.  Because the light is better here, he says.  Substitute economist for 
accounting-reformer, and the joke applies to recent discussion of accounting reform.
4whether GAAP is so rules-based (as opposed to principles-based) as to impair its capacity 
to deliver financial statements providing a fair presentation.  
By reviewing evolution of GAAP from a living natural language into a system 
supplemented by formal-code, the discussion first suggests that GAAP’s qualities do not 
prevent it from providing a fair presentation and, by reviewing the mixed foundations of 
GAAP in both rules and principles, confirms that GAAP has this capacity.  Accordingly, 
the discussion shows that these debates are beside the point.  The debated issues likely 
had little or nothing to do with the accounting frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Pursuing overlooked factors contributing to these episodes, the next two Parts 
consider accounting’s traditional function as numerical history and its increasing call to 
service as narrative prognosis. Part II provides perspectives on basic accounting theory 
and concepts, showing accounting’s essential character as numerical history epitomized 
in the balance sheet and income statement.  It explains how contemporary debates in 
accounting practice deemphasize accounting as numerical history to enlist it in more 
ambitious functions, instancing pressure towards fair-value not historical-cost accounting 
and cash-flow statement data instead of accrual accounting.  It includes a modest 
proposal for contrast: to improve accounting, abandon the conceit of reporting single 
precise figures for earnings and owners’ equity in favor of reporting faithful ranges for 
these concepts.
Part III extends this story of accounting’s transformation from numerical history 
to narrative prognosis by explaining the wide variety of circumstances when narrative 
information is necessary or appropriate as a component of financial reporting.  It shows 
how this vehicle has been used to provide forward-looking information and argues that 
this process is more likely to create temptations for aggressive or fraudulent accounting 
than a format of accounting as numerical history.  Despite these cautionary views, 
moreover, this Part shows relentless moves to prognostication in financial reporting, 
epitomized by newly-sanctioned continuous disclosure concepts and auditor disclosure 
concerning future financial statement reliability.  These comport with a broader cultural 
preoccupation with the future.  For financial reporting, these manifestations risk retarding 
accounting quality, shown in a penultimate section to be modern finance theory’s central 
contribution to modern accounting.
The Article concludes by emphasizing the daunting character of its implications. 
Narrative prognosis may be essential to a rational system of financial reporting.  But 
optimizing its balance with numerical history is critical.  An imbalance likely contributed 
more to the late 1990s/early 2000s frauds than accounting’s code-qualities or rules-
rigidity.  Although finding the balance will be elusive, the search will enrich 
understanding. It can also provide a blueprint for reforming the forward-looking 
disclosure system along more cautious lines. 
5I.  FALSE DICHOTOMIES IN POWER TALK
According to many, a chief culprit in the accounting scandals of the late 1990s
and early 2000s was accounting’s rule-based rigidity, sacrificing its principles-based 
texture.4  A tentative solution to this assignment of blame revived a faded idea requiring 
not only complying with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) but presenting 
a fair presentation of financial results and condition.5 The diagnosis and cure both 
disguise more profoundly important phenomena.  Reviewing the discussion’s terms
shows much ado about the wrong questions, and the ultimate but underappreciated
discovery of this misdirection.
A. “Fairly Presents” versus GAAP or Both?
The standard form of audit report in the United States expresses an opinion as to 
whether an examined set of financial statements fairly presents a company’s financial 
position, results of operation, and cash flows, in conformity with GAAP.6 Two issues and 
their relation arise.  The issues are what is “GAAP” and what does “fairly presents”
mean.  The relational questions are: is it possible to meet one by meeting the other (say 
complying with GAAP constituting a fair presentation) and/or does meeting one imply 
not meeting the other (for example, does a fair presentation necessarily entail overriding
GAAP?). 
4 E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 108(d) Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 
U.S.C. ____ (directing SEC to study GAAP’s rules-versus-principles basis); HARVEY 
PITT, SEC CHAIRMAN, TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING 
AND URBAN AFFAIRS (FASB guidance has "developed based on rules, and not on broad 
principles," and calling instead for principles to "evolve to become general and principle-
based, instead of encyclopedic and rule-based, principles”); FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD.: 
PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO U.S. STANDARD SETTING, NO. 107205 (Oct. 2002) 
(proposal to adopt a principles-based accounting system); SENATE REPORT NO. 107-205, 
at 13 (2002) (expressing concern about rule-approach to accounting matters); see also 
Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A New 
Ballgame for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 93-94 (2003);   Anthony J. [sic], 
Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting 
Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 161-62 (2003); Matthew A. Melone, 
United States Accounting Standards: Rules or Principles? The Devil Is Not in the Details,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161 (2004) (accepting premise as true, though arguing that the 
cure does not reside in shifting from a rules-based to a standards-based system).
5 Financial “condition” is the label favored by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to designate the relationship among assets, liabilities and owners’ equity as 
depicted on a balance sheet. Compare infra notes 20 & 21.
6 Financial “position” is the label favored by the Financial Accounting Principles Board 
(FASB) to designate the relationship among assets, liabilities and owners’ equity as 
depicted on a balance sheet. Compare infra notes 20 & 21.
61.  What is GAAP? — GAAP can be described as natural language, as code, or 
both.  The latter possibility reveals a preliminary false dichotomy: it is in fact both,
though this is often overlooked.
— GAAP as Natural Living Language.  Generally accepted accounting principles 
traditionally were those concepts of financial reporting in common use.  The concepts
constituted a natural living language.7 The resulting system was akin to the common law, 
one that evolves with custom and usage rather than fixed by code.8 As with the common 
law, generally accepted accounting used natural language to apply general concepts to 
particular facts.9  As a natural living language, accounting is grammar recognized as
official through general acceptance, a bottom-up approach, not ordained by an official 
body backed by legal force, a top-down approach.10
Accounting’s traditional character as natural language produced multiple 
designations for like concepts and variable meanings for similar expressions.  Examples 
endure and appear in how its nomenclature is replete with synonyms.  Take the following 
clusters of terms that for a business entity usually have identical meanings: (1): book 
value, owners’ equity and net worth; (2) earnings, profit and net income; and (3) accounts 
payable, payables, current obligations, and current liabilities.11  The term “results of 
operations” is akin to net income, earnings or profits.  Even fixed assets go by various 
terms, including long-term assets; long-lived assets; or property, plant and equipment; the 
latter often shortened to plant.
The virtue of this natural-language quality is capacity for nuance and tailoring to 
particular situations from abstract fluid categories. Net income and earnings may usefully 
7 See Shyam Sunder, Rethinking the Structure of Accounting and Auditing, 7 INDIAN 
ACCOUNTING REVIEW (2003), reprinted in THE ICFAI JOURNAL OF AUDIT PRACTICE, 
www.icfairpress.org (2004) (also available from SSRN.COM, June 16, 2003) [hereinafter 
Sunder, Rethinking the Structure].  In this context, natural living language denotes a 
system of semiotic communication in which uses define meanings through an endless 
evolutionary process, contrasted with a view of an idiom of fixed or inherent meaning.  
See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe tras. 2d ed. 1967).
8 See Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OX. U. 
COMM. L. J. 155 (2003); Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part 
II), 3 OX. U. COMM. L. J. 1 (2003).
9 See A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE, SECOND SERIES 77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973).
10
 Sunder, Rethinking the Structure, supra note 7, at 5.
11 See ROBERT N. ANTHONY, RETHINKING THE RULES OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING (2004) 
[hereinafter, ANTHONY, RETHINKING THE RULES].
7be distinguished for a specific business, fitting usually-synonymous concepts to a 
particular context. The adage that accounting is the language of business is rooted in 
these natural-language origins, where language mediates and maps context.  Accounting 
emerged as financial grammar whose linguistics influenced the behavior and decision-
making of information consumers. These qualities can facilitate communication, 
providing a vocabulary that, through usage, improves a manager’s ability to explain and a 
user’s ability to interpret information. 
Natural language presents limits. Synonyms, for example, have different 
significations to different users, producing exchanges in which two people can hold 
different meanings.  A manager may attempt to distinguish net income from earnings but 
a shareholder may not appreciate the distinction.  The result can be misunderstandings, 
and sub-optimal capital allocation. Synonyms bearing slightly different meanings can 
slow decision-making, and create inefficiencies in markets where accounting plays a role. 
Consumers of accounting information can be predisposed to understand terms in certain 
ways.  Sharpening and unifying definitions using unique terms can enhance the mediation 
to promote optimal interpretation and decisions.12  This possibility creates appeal for
accounting codification.
— GAAP as Code. Appeals for codification of generally accepted accounting 
concepts arose in the 1930s.  Perceived failures in the grammar of accounting were 
blamed, in part, for 1929’s stock market crash, along with the financial bubble of the 
preceding years and the Great Depression that ensued.  That decade’s reforms (led by the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) deliberately attempted 
to thwart accounting’s character as a living natural language.13
A top-down approach was sought, using formal bodies of accounting authorities.  
From 1939 to 1959, the Committee on Accounting Procedure promulgated accounting’s 
gospel, followed from 1959 to 1973 by the Accounting Principles Board.  These 
accounting leaders articulated accounting concepts using bulletins and opinions, 
promulgations bearing interpretive qualities of leadership not mandates. As a result, these 
early pronouncements never fully penetrated the natural language of accounting and
never gained the widespread acceptance that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) had hoped since the 1930s that formal accounting pronouncements would 
achieve.14
To close on this quest, in 1973 the SEC created the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) to articulate formal accounting doctrine that would be deemed 
12 See AHMED RIAHI-BELKAOUI, ACCOUNTING THEORY (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter, RIAHI-
BELKAOUI, ACCOUNTING THEORY], at 304-305.
13 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (rev. ed. 1995) 
[hereinafter SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET], at 48-49.
14 See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 551-53.
8generally accepted by fiat.  To facilitate this, FASB was anointed with powers broader 
than its predecessors.  It was structured to involve the accounting profession directly in 
its activities, useful as a way to integrate the concept of general acceptance of accounting 
as a natural language into the formal promulgation process.15 The result was more 
effective than those of FASB’s predecessors, a successful top-down approach to 
accounting.  In fact, FASB so succeeded in rendering generally accepted accounting a 
code-based system that many believed it solved one problem and created another: 
accounting gospel according to FASB became “an excuse for CPAs to abandon their 
judgment.”16
Accounting concepts sanctioned as generally accepted by an authoritative body 
provide codification. FASB’s code-setting has more affinities with legislative or statutory 
directives than with common law evolution. GAAP is founded upon FASB’s seven
Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts, supplemented by nearly 150 Statements of 
Financial Accounting Standards, as well as thousands of other detailed interpretations and 
technical bulletins.  As more akin to legislation, FASB’s accounting is formal language 
often prescribing accounting rules with excruciating particularity, especially in its 
interpretations and bulletins.
This specificity appears in such simple contexts as defining basic concepts known 
to generally accepted accounting’s natural language for at least five centuries.  FASB 
provides precise definitions for the terms assets, liabilities, owners’ equity, revenue and 
expenses.17 Scores of other concepts are likewise treated as technical tools.  Complexities 
arise in this attempt to tame a natural language, raising questions such as whether gains 
and losses on the sale of property, plant and equipment are part of income or not, and 
how a wide variety of other transactions should be accounted for, as by running them 
through the income statement or recording them directly on the balance sheet as changes 
in owners’ equity.18  FASB proffers definitive answers to such questions, but the 
questions are intractable.
15 Sunder, Rethinking the Structure, supra note 7, at 7.
16 Id.
17 FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
(SFAC) 1; see LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND 
AUDITING FOR LAWYERS (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter, CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY 
ACCOUNTING], at 500 ff. (glossary entries defining these concepts both in general terms 
and formal FASB terms) 
18 CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, supra note 17, ch. 7; see, e.g., FIN. 
ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 130, 
REPORTING COMPREHENSIVE INCOME.
9— A Preliminary False Dichotomy. The intractability of many accounting 
questions renders FASB’s codification of generally accepted accounting concepts
necessarily partial.  It can be neither comprehensive in scope nor exhaustive in its 
treatments. In fact, despite FASB’s leadership, GAAP remains rooted in numerous 
sources, not articulated in a single code. The United States Supreme Court has noted that 
as many as 19 different sources constituting GAAP could control an accounting issue, 
variously providing conflicting solutions to identical situations.19
The choice between natural language and code reveals a preliminary false 
dichotomy.  Continuing the legal parallel, it is as if legislatures alone could pronounce 
law with finitude, dispensing with the need to interpret and apply statutes in part icular 
contexts, as done in a common-law system, first by practicing lawyers and sometimes
ultimately by judges.  Even the most ambitious codification movements in law never 
achieved such absolutism.20
Even with FASB’s partial codification, for example, basic terms can bear open-
ended meanings. Consider various terms used to designate the balance sheet, which 
include the statement of position and the statement of condition.21 FASB prefers the term 
statement of position while the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prefers the 
19 Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 101 (1995) (Kennedy, J.) 
(lamenting that "there are 19 different GAAP sources, any number of which might present 
conflicting treatments of a particular accounting question"). These include FASB 
Statements, Interpretations, Technical Bulletins, Implementation Guides; Accounting 
Research Bulletins; Accounting Principles Board Opinions; AICPA Statements of 
Position, Accounting Guides, Practice Bulletins, Accounting Interpretations and Issue 
Papers; SEC Rules and Regulations; and Emerging Issues Task Force Abstracts, Minutes 
and Issue Summaries.
20 E.g., Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1191 (1994). Codification is the systematic integration and expression of a body of 
knowledge in a single compendium.  In law, this is process is often presented as an 
alternative to common law; in practice, this vision is functionally unachievable.  The 
tradition dates to the Code Napoleon, includes codes developed by Jeremy Bentham and 
David Dudley Field, restatements promulgated by the American Law Institute, various 
Congressional bodies of law such as bankruptcy and tax and—in all states but Louisiana, 
itself a product of the Code Napoleon—the UCC.  The UCC is probably the most 
successful codification effort, but even its crisp terms depend on judicial interpretation 
through application of principles.  See infra text accompanying notes 47 to 48 (discussing 
legal positivism versus modern legal theory).
21 Notice the use of these apparently interchangeable terms in the first two paragraphs of 
this Part I, supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
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term statement of condition.22 The marketplace still calls it a balance sheet.  However 
denominated, this document is a record of the cost of measurable resources not used up,
arrayed against obligations of liability-claimants and owners.  It is not intended to reveal 
financial status, whether denominated as condition, position or other such term.  
Calling the balance sheet a statement of condition is almost certainly misleading, 
and even statement of position may fail adequately to express its limits.  (Statement of 
circumstance is closer to reality.)  Balance sheet—the term that emerged from 
accounting’s origins in natural language to reflect claims commanded balanced with
claims owed23—is more faithful to its capacity than FASB’s or the SEC’s terms.
However the document is denominated, these limits on the balance sheet and on formal 
efforts to ordain accounting concepts by fiat relate to the meaning of the concept “fairly 
presents.”
2.  What is “Fairly Presents”? — The term fairly presents is not defined by law in 
the United States nor in authoritative accounting literature.24  This reticence echoes the 
old-fashioned sense of accounting as natural language. But the concept entered the 
vocabulary as part of the formal securities regulatory process, as formal code-like legal 
articulation rather than as natural living language.25 Yet even using this approach, the 
reticence to define it reflects a sensibility familiar to the common law, of leaving to 
professional judgment the ultimate application of general concepts to specific situations. 
The meaning of “fairly presents” depends on what a system of financial reporting 
is designed to depict.  Meeting the view may mean tracking assets, liabilities, owners’ 
equity, revenues and expenses using the foundational objectives and purposes of 
accounting, whether these exercises are animated by general acceptance or articulated, 
code-like, by FASB or other bodies.
22 Compare FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
CONCEPTS (SFAC) 1___ with SEC Regulation S-X, § ___.
23 See GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN 
THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING (1998) (explaining 
derivation of concepts of debit and credit used in bookkeeping to kindred Italian words, 
debitore and creditore, which mean literally debtor and creditor).
24 Compare AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, THE MEANING OF 
“PRESENT FAIRLY IN CONFORMITY WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES” IN THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT, STATEMENT ON AUDITING 
STANDARDS NO. 69 (1992).
25 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics and Cash: An Essay on the 
True and Fair View, 28 N. C .J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 893 (2003) (tracing concept’s 
history).
11
The result of applying these exercises consistently should reliably mirror external 
business activity. When this occurs, the result should “present fairly,” representing 
economic reality.  But accounting concepts are tools, not truths.  Judgment is necessary to 
determine that their application in particular settings produces faithful measures of 
economic reality.  
Accounting concepts are generalizations—no matter how detailed their 
specification—and applying them is particularization.  A code can declare that an asset is 
a resource not used up but deciding whether an investment in a new technology is such a 
resource, and therefore an asset, requires judgment.
With any statement of accounting concepts, there will be numerous potentially 
correct reporting methods.  A requirement to “present fairly” can therefore be met in a 
variety of ways. The requirement captures a range of fidelity to economic reality.  
Complying with applicable accounting concepts, however these are ordained, may not be
enough.  Economic realities are measured by the instruments of accounting but the 
common law mind-set rightly doubts its ability to craft ex ante directives universally 
applicable to reflect them faithfully.  
This reality produced an apparent dichotomy between complying with GAAP on 
the one hand and providing a fair presentation on the other.  It famously appeared—and 
then was neglected for nearly two generations—in Judge Henry Friendly’s opinion in 
United States v. Simon.26 In reviewing an accountant’s potential liability for fraudulent 
financial reporting, Judge Friendly said that compliance with GAAP does not necessarily 
satisfy the fairly-presents requirement.27
At trial, the accountant sought a jury instruction stating that he could not be guilty 
of fraud unless, under GAAP, the financial statements he certified did not fairly present 
the company’s financial condition and results.28 Rejecting this proposed instruction, 
Judge Friendly instead defined the issue as whether the financial statements, taken as a 
whole, fairly present the company’s financial condition and results.29
26 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
27 Id. at 805-06.  For a current re-assessment of the case, see James D. Cox, Reforming 
the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting 
Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 301, 319-20 (2003).
28 The proposed jury instruction further qualified that liability could only be found if, in 
addition, any departure from GAAP involved willful disregard and the accountant knew 
the financials were false and held an intent to deceive.  United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 
796, ___.
29 If they do not, then the issue is whether the accountant acted in good faith.  Proving 
compliance with GAAP evidences good faith, but is not conclusive.  Relevant factors 
include the authoritative quality of the sources relied on in forming the judgment about 
what GAAP required.  
12
The case thus distinguishes between compliance with GAAP and achieving a fair 
presentation, and elevates the latter to primary importance. If complying with GAAP 
does not produce a fair presentation, then compliance with GAAP is subordinated to 
promoting a fair presentation.  In such cases, GAAP must be overridden.
The apparent duality between compliance with GAAP and fair presentation 
continued (and continues) to appear in the language contained in standard audit reports.  
But the case was never generalized in federal securities litigation or enforcement to 
achieve enduring legal significance.30  In accounting and auditing practice, moreover, it 
was essentially assumed that compliance with GAAP meant a fair presentation.  This 
assumption could be accurate if GAAP’s generality is sufficiently capacious to permit 
fair tailoring for application to particular contexts. 
3.  Falsity in the Dichotomy —When accounting scandals erupted in the early 
2000s, accounting authorities returned to Judge Friendly’s desuetude distinction.  Perhaps 
fair presentation does differ from complying with GAAP and should be made primary.  If 
so, then it will sometimes not be possible for an auditor to give the standard form of 
opinion, that financial statements both comply with GAAP and fairly present a 
company’s financial performance and condition.  If so, a quiet revolution occurred.
Consider a post-scandal SEC pronouncement addressing the relationship between 
compliance with GAAP and fairly presents. The pronouncement accompanied 
explanation of corporate-officer certification requirements imposed under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  These require top officers to attest that financial statements do both, comply
with GAAP and fairly present. The SEC, reviving Judge Friendly’s long-ignored 
approach, privileged fairly presents over GAAP.  
The SEC specified that its regulations require certification that “the overall 
financial disclosure fairly presents, in all material respects, the company's financial 
condition, results of operations and cash flows.”31 The SEC clarified that the certification 
is not limited to an attestation that the financial statements accord with GAAP, 
emphasizing instead the broader requirement of “overall material accuracy and 
completeness."32 Furthermore, it declared: “Presenting financial information in 
30 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B. U. L.  REV.  301, ___ (2004) [hereinafter, Coffee, Gatekeeper 
Failure and Reform] (reporting inability to find any cases relying upon this ruling in
United States v. Simon).  Relics of the case appear in two SEC releases concerning its 
enforcement actions.  See In re Caterpillar, Inc., SEC RELEASE NO. 34-30532 (March 31, 
1992); Edison Schools, Inc., SEC RELEASE NO. 34-45925 (May 14, 2002).
31 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN 
COMPANIES’ QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL REPORTS, RELEASE NO. 33-8124 (Aug. 28, 2002).
32 Id.
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conformity with generally accepted accounting principles may not necessarily satisfy 
obligations under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”33
The SEC by fiat thus declares dead a practice norm that compliance with GAAP 
is both necessary and sufficient to achieve a fair presentation. As a matter of logic, this 
SEC position should mean that the standard form of audit letter should be changed: it is 
possible (even likely) for GAAP-compliance to be inadequate to reach a fair presentation.  
If so, the latter is to be privileged and the audit report would have to say the statements 
fairly present, whether or not in compliance with GAAP.  Yet this revision to the 
standard audit report has not been made.  Instead, debate moved to a different plane, 
concerning the congruence of GAAP with the fairly presents requirement.  That is, it 
became a question of GAAP’s capacity to yield a fair presentation.  
B.  Rules versus Principles or Both?
Revelation in the early 2000s of numerous spectacular accounting frauds spawned
a seemingly-vigorous debate in contemporary accounting policy.  The debate centered on 
whether GAAP had become too rule-bound in FASB’s top-down mandates, losing its 
principles-orientation associated with its natural-language origins that would congeal 
with the fairly presents requirement.  If too rule-bound, compliance with GAAP would 
impair the possibility of meeting the fairly-presents obligation. Virtually all participants 
in the debate assumed that GAAP was exceedingly rules-based.34  They could point to 
three forces creating this perceived condition.  
33 Id., n. 55. Thus the SEC takes the position that a "fair presentation" is not about results 
alone but also about:
the selection of appropriate accounting policies, proper application of 
appropriate accounting policies, disclosure of financial information that is 
informative and reasonably reflects the underlying transactions and events 
and the inclusion of any additional disclosure necessary to provide 
investors with a materially accurate and complete picture of an issuer's 
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.
Id.
34 See supra note 4.  For a refreshing exception in the legal literature, see William W. 
Bratton, Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1045-52 (2003) 
[hereinafter Bratton, Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents] (providing a four-part 
rebuttal to the assertion, and also noting that the auditing profession preferred the existing 
conception of a rules-based approach though urged changes in the rules); see also
Katherine Schipper, Principles-Based Accounting Principles, ACCOUNTING HORIZONS
(March 2003) (explaining how principles emerge when promulgated according to an 
underlying conceptual framework).
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First, FASB’s codification mandate and resulting efforts made it a creator of rules 
rather than principles.  And this was of course exactly what it was told to do.  Second, 
auditors might prefer a rule to a principle when this relieves them of the anxiety (and 
legal risks) of exercising judgment.35  Letters are easier than spirits to defend, and 
auditors played a major role in shaping FASB’s promulgations.36  Third, some opined
that as business transactions grow more sophisticated and complex, accounting concepts 
follow suit through dense complex rules not broad general principles.37
Most participants in this debate proceeded with little examination of the 
assumption that FASB produced rules not principles and that resulting GAAP was too 
heavily rules-based, sacrificing its principles-based, natural-language qualities.38 In part 
because it is impossible to prove that any accounting system is more rules-based or 
principles-based, commentators compared US GAAP to other accounting systems.39
Most saw evidence of looser, principles-based accounting systems used in other 
countries.  But even this exercise proves little, and evidence of the opposite interpretation
was essentially ignored.40
35 Bratton, Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, supra note 34.
36 See supra text accompanying note 15.
37 For example, FASB and others point to its rules on derivative financial instruments as 
illustrating the obsessively detailed rules based approach, though FASB notes this quality 
largely reflects the complexity and variety of the underlying instruments to be accounted 
for.  FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
(SFAS) __ : ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVES (___ 200_).
38 On the other hand, academic research in accounting supported the view that using 
principles rather than rules can promote conservative accounting and discourage 
aggressive accounting. E.g., Andrew D. Cuccia, Karl Hackenbrack & Mark W. Nelson, 
The Ability of Professional Standards to Mitigate Aggressive Reporting, 70 THE 
ACCOUNTING REVIEW 227 (1995); Dennis R. Beresford, It’s Time to Simplify Accounting 
Standards, 187 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY 65 (1999).
39 E.g., Frederick Gill, Principles-Based Accounting Principles, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & 
COMM. REG. 967, 972 (2003).  In fact, Sarbanes-Oxley itself invites comparing US 
GAAP with UK GAAP.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 108(d) Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. ____.
40 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform 
(And It Might Just Work), 35 U. CONN. L. REV. 915, 976 (2003) (surveying a leading 
three-volume treatise, published by Palgrave and sponsored by KPMG, detailing the 
major accounting principles of 19 countries plus the EU and IASC and finding that in
total pages devoted to these systems, a proxy for prescriptive density, US GAAP comes 
in fifth place—after the UK, Germany, Japan and France).  Furthermore, rule 
characteristics develop by accretion of authoritative interpretation of principles, making 
relatively older systems such as US GAAP appear more rule-bound than relatively new 
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The dominant assumption of rules-domination, accompanied by these positive 
explanations for this condition, were set against a normative background concerning 
whether what FASB wrought was optimal.  At a practical level, compared to general 
accounting principles, detailed accounting rules may be more difficult to use, costly to 
implement and—most poignantly—allow for structuring transactions to meet literal 
requirements while ignoring intent and spirit (read, to commit fraud).  Advocates of a 
principles-based approach argued that it facilitates superior reporting and—most to 
present purpose—facilitates achieving a fair presentation when complying with GAAP.
A practical solution urgently was needed.  A crisis loomed: if the widely-held 
assumption of GAAP as rules-excessive were true, then GAAP had to be reinvented—
post haste—and the standard form of audit letter rewritten.  After all, complying with that 
kind of GAAP would frequently mean absence of a fair presentation.  If a fair 
presentation is privileged, then a rules-based GAAP makes itself functionally irrelevant.  
Fortunately, despite the weight of rhetoric, the unexamined assumption turned out to be
false.
1.  Classifications —What are rules and principles and how do they differ?41
Consider some automobile-driving concepts.  Examples of driving rules are no-right-
turn-on-red, no U-turns, red-means-stop and green-means-go, use turn signals, stop for 
school buses and wear seat belts.42 Principles are yellow-signals-caution, drive as a 
reasonable, prudent person and exercise due care in relation to driving conditions one 
faces. A rational system of driving-licensing and operation involves both sorts of 
directives.  It is neither rules-based nor principles-based.
In accounting, rules begin with: a set of general purpose financial statements 
contains a balance sheet and income statement.  Balance sheets record certain assets and 
most liabilities and show the difference as owners’ equity; the income statement shows 
how business activity drives changes in owners’ equity, by recording items of revenue 
and associated items of expense to aggregate a period’s net income (or loss).  Principles
concern determining those other assets and some liabilities not appearing on a balance 
sheet and ascertaining the association between items of expense and revenue.  
To unpack these broad examples, rules include specifying as assets accounts 
receivable and as expenses charge-offs associated with receivables-generation.  Examples 
systems such as International Accounting Standards.  See Mark W. Nelson, Behavioral 
Evidence on the Effects of Principles- and Rules-Based Standards, ACCOUNTING 
HORIZONS (2003) [hereinafter Nelson, Behavioral Evidence].
41 A common formulation distinguishes rules from principles and then treats the 
aggregation of all these as standards.  See Nelson, Behavioral Evidence, supra note 40.
42 Compare Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 502-528 (2000).
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of possible rules might be that the allowance for doubtful accounts should be set at 5% of 
receivables generated during normal times, 3% during economic booms, and 8% during 
economic busts; a principle governing the allowance for doubtful accounts would direct 
making a reasonable estimate of probable charge-offs in the light of past experience in 
the business and its industry (what GAAP provides). An example of a principle might be 
to associate expenses with revenue in a reasonable manner; a rule-approach to this topic 
is that disbursements to acquire resources used up during an accounting period are 
expenses of that period (what GAAP provides).  
These examples are representative of GAAP.38A The excursion shows two things.  
It shows how difficult it is to prove that GAAP is rules-based or principles-based.  And it 
shows, as with the examples of automobile-driving concepts, that GAAP is, in fact, a 
mixture of the two.  In an elaborate study required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC 
confirmed this conclusion and thus resolved the (false) debate.
2.  Resolution — The SEC found that existing GAAP is a mixture of rules and 
principles.43  It declared the mixture substantially effective, and renamed it an objectives-
based system.44  The SEC study indicated that under such a system there should be 
limited need ever to indulge a GAAP override.45 Complying with an objectives-based 
GAAP yields “fairly presented” financial statements. This conclusion thus resolved what 
otherwise loomed as a crisis: that GAAP would have to be scrapped if it could not 
promote a fair presentation.
The SEC’s elaborate study of the rules-principles dichotomy shows the 
dichotomy’s falsity.  The SEC ultimately expresses the view that US GAAP is a mix of 
principles and rules and designates neither as superior.  Instead it embraces what it 
believes to be a hybrid, which it calls an “objectives-based” system.  It boils down to a 
different name for the prevailing mix of rules and principles, all intended to promote 
financial statements that “fairly present” financial condition and performance.  This 
38A See also Nelson, Behavioral Evidence, supra note 40 (providing additional examples).
43 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(d) OF 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES 
FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, § III.G 
(undated; released 2003) [hereinafter SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING STUDY].
44
“Substantially” because the SEC’s key prescription directs FASB to link future 
accounting standards to its underlying conceptual framework as a way to promote this 
objectives-based concept, which the SEC indicates likely will incrementally produce 
results better characterized as principles than rules, though it does not regard the goal of 
producing more principles than rules as a primary objective. See id.
45 Compare FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO U.S. 
STANDARD SETTING, supra note 4 (proposal to include a “true and fair view” override).
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resolution of the false dichotomy is correct, but the struggle that went into it is also a 
false catharsis, for deeper issues unaddressed are at stake.46
At a more practical level, FASB’s statutory-like approach to accounting was 
intended to enable accounting’s promulgators to respond to emerging issues and thwart 
observed abuses.  A limited capacity to anticipate managerial reactions to these 
regulatory responses produces bias favoring rule-like pronouncements rather than 
principles.  This can create another problem: rules create cracks for exploitation.  On the 
other hand, accounting’s natural language origins cannot be squelched and, when 
accompanied by brooding concepts such as fairly presents, forge congruity between 
accounting and fair presentations.  The reservoir of accounting concepts—code and 
natural language alike—are abstractions requiring concrete circumstances for their 
particularization.  
Modern lawyers will recognize the false dichotomy in the rules-principles debate, 
bearing echoes of contemporary discourse on the merits of legal positivism.  Legal 
positivism treats law as a system of rules.  H.L.A. Hart’s legal positivism contained a 
theory of law and an account of adjudication.47 In it, law is a matter of rules, divided into 
two types: primary rules stating duties or rights and secondary rules that regulate their 
application (including the rule of recognition, a norms-based conception against which 
the validity of all secondary and primary rules is gauged in terms of social acceptance).  
Hart held that law’s use of language as expression invited judicial interpretation, 
constrained through a conception of law as carrying an uncontroversial core component 
along with a more contentious penumbra where discretion is exercised.
Modern legal theorists dating to Holmes doubted this conception, observing 
judicial discretion even in the face of the most clearly defined legal concepts as rules.  
Ronald Dworkin most successfully presented the more capacious conception of law as 
46
  The SEC may believe it ushered in a new regime.  See supra note 44.  In fact, some 
regard contributions to the rules-principles debate as a major effect of Sarbanes Oxley.  
Compare Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 30, at 342-43:
Sarbanes-Oxley ushers in and accelerates a major and probably inevitable 
transition, which will move us from a rules-based system of financial 
disclosure to a principles-based system. In contrast to Europe, the United 
States has long relied on a rules-based system in which generally accepted 
accounting principles (or "GAAP") were precise, technical, and limited. 
Typically, these narrow rules afforded safe harbors from liability for 
issuers and gatekeepers. In contrast, European accounting principles were 
broader, more generalized, and sometimes indefinite to the point of being 
ineffable.
47 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW.
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including not only rules but also principles.48  These provide a spirit to law that guide 
judges and others in applying rules.  The principles are not necessarily instances of 
natural law or morality, but are a feature of law to be interpreted.  Law is thus a seamless 
web of rules and principles, making positivism an impoverished account.  Judicial 
interpretation is not (only) a function of law as language with cores and penumbras but a 
function of interpretive practice.  Properly conducted, legal interpretation yields a correct 
answer to any legal issue.
Whatever view a legal theorist holds on the critique of legal positivism, the 
critique applies more forcibly to accounting as positive code.  First, in accounting moral 
conceptions are more attenuated.  The spirit may be discernable, expressed in concepts of 
fair presentation, but it is not a question of the natural moral order.  Second, primary and 
secondary concepts may be identifiable—a primary rule is to record revenue when earned 
and a secondary rule is to achieve a fair presentation.   But any equivalent to a rule of 
recognition the accountant or auditor faces is hardly a function of social acceptance; at 
best it is a matter of general acceptance within the profession and possibly among market 
participants.  Third, accounting is far more akin to a seamless system of rules and 
principles.  Despite discretion, moreover, even Herculean accountants might, in about the 
same way as Herculean judges, be expected to reach correct results, at least in the sense 
of achieving a fair presentation.
Law and accounting—in both code- and non-code-based form—involve 
abstraction of the particular and particularization of the abstract.49 At maximal generality, 
everything in the universe—or a given universe—is the same.  In case law, every case is 
of the form plaintiff versus defendant.  This label is meaningless for its lack of 
discrimination.  At maximal specificity, everything is different.  In cases, Brown v. Smith
tells something only about that particular case, meaningless due to its hyper-granularity.  
Case analysis searches for the normatively-significant features of the case, such as buyer 
versus seller for breach of warranty contained in a contract for the sale of goods.  This is
combining particularity with generality to achieve normativity;50 this is the activity of the 
accountant in determining how to apply GAAP to particular transactions so that resulting 
financial statements are fair presentations of business reality.
48 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1973); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE.
49 See Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract 
Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 814-19 (1985) (showing mutual 
dependency between law's conception of freedom of contract and the philosopher's social 
contract. in the dual process of abstraction of the particular and particularization of the 
abstract). 
50 See Gregory M. Silverman, Imperatives, Normativity, and the Law, 31 CONN. L. REV. 
601 (1999).
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Consider the relation between statutory (or regulatory) and common law.  
Statutory (and regulatory) law can be drafted as neat, clean, and clear.  The appearance is 
deceiving, however, because rules are studded with loopholes and ambiguities.50A The 
common law must be distilled, discerned, worked-over; it is understood as a capacious 
system, and though prone to cracks, operating to seal the cracks are a variety of formal 
institutional devices, including accepted modes of reasoning such as by analogy, 
principles of stare decisis and precedent, and the recognition of appropriate institutions 
and processes to make it operational.51 This complex process takes time.  Accounting as 
code and natural language bears similar characteristics; making GAAP a coherent system 
likewise requires time.  But accounting, as we will see, increasingly lacks the luxury of 
time.  And this is the fatal feature of the current accounting condition.
II. NUMERICAL HISTORY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Traditional accounting is largely numerical history.  An overarching accounting 
concept holds that only transactions that have occurred are recorded.  Accounting is 
quintessentially history.  Another holds that only transactions measurable in monetary 
units are recorded.  Accounting is quintessentially numerical.  These basic propositions, 
rooted in accounting’s ancient natural language and unchanged by its modern codifiers, 
are assumed in all interesting questions of accounting theory.  In related debates, 
however, pressure increasingly appears to jettison these basics, sewing acorns for an oak-
sized movement away from accounting as numerical history and towards a far more 
ambitious function as narrative prognosis.
A.  The Basic Statements
Accounting’s traditional chief vehicles to express numerical history are the 
balance sheet and income statement.  A traditional debate in accounting theory considers 
the relation between these two archival documents as tools to capture what has occurred.   
A central question of accounting theory is whether the balance sheet and income 
statement are both necessary components of a set of general purpose financial statements.
It is possible to record all transactions only in the balance sheet (revenues increase 
owners’ equity and expenses reduce owners’ equity).  In theory, at least, it is possible to 
record all transactions in the income statement and ignore the balance sheet.  The same 
measurements are used in both reports (in accounting parlance, they articulate): the 
difference between revenues and expenses constitutes earnings and this amount is 
equivalent to the period’s change in owners’ equity. 
50A See Alexander & Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, supra note 20.
51 See Robert S. Summers, How Law is Formal and Why It Matters, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
1165 (1997).
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Consider two views of the conceptual underpinnings.  The balance sheet view 
sees revenues and expenses as resulting from changes in assets and liabilities (revenues 
are asset increases and/or liability decreases while expenses are asset decreases and/or 
liability increases).  The income statement view sees earnings as the key, with assets and 
liabilities as residual holding places for the results of operating activities driving revenues 
and expenses.
FASB and the SEC take the balance sheet view.52  The balance sheet view 
emphasizes measuring owners’ equity and changes in it (earnings simply drive this) while 
the income statement view emphasizes measuring earnings (assets and liabilities are just 
residuals; this places greater emphasis on accounting’s accrual concept and matching 
principle, the idea that revenue should be recorded when earned and all items of expense 
incurred to generate it be matched to the period in which it was earned).53
Heuristics are invoked to defend using both documents, whichever one is deemed 
superior.  The balance sheet is a statement of position (a snapshot, as of a date) and the 
income statement is a statement of performance (a motion picture, for a period of time).  
These images help explain why both documents are useful, but these images also show 
the limits of each: they both look backward and use the same measurement concepts.  
This invites an alternative possibility: finding a way to overcome these limits to improve 
the qualities of both so that neither is superior to the other.
This possibility unfolds debate in a different direction, envisioning for accounting 
a more ambitious role than numerical historian.  This view admits that both statements 
may be useful because they provide different perspectives, but contends that their unified 
measurement means they essentially tell the same thing.  If so, the documents are 
essentially redundant due to an unnecessary urge for articulation (using the same 
measurements for both).
To provide non-redundant information, assets and liabilities could be defined and 
measured solely in reference to the balance sheet and revenues and expenses solely in 
reference to the incomes statement.  Different measures would be used for each 
statement, shedding compulsion for articulation.   This view is supported by the claim 
that when you try to force articulation you get owners’ equity and earnings figures that 
bear no indication of actual worth (value).  Permitting non-articulation could enable
owners’ equity and earnings figures to indicate value.54  This argument reflects desire to 
move accounting away from its historic-numeric model and towards a model of different 
utility: to provide information about value, a prospective-looking conception. 
52 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING STUDY, 
supra note 40.
53
 The next section discusses accounting’s accrual concept and matching principle 
further. 
54 See RIAHI-BELKAOUI, ACCOUNTING THEORY, supra note 12, at 126-133.
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Whether this ambition should be pursued is uncertain.  To be ready for such 
service, accounting’s fundamentals would need to be sturdier than appears possible.  One 
must be able to walk before one can run and accounting has enough difficulty walking.  
A related fundamental question of accounting illustrates. When accounting choices entail 
a recording system producing greater fidelity in the balance sheet or the income 
statement, to which statement should the choice be more faithful?  
Take accounting for inventory, on which GAAP offers choices.55  Leading 
alternatives are to assume goods flow through a business on a first-in-first-out (FIFO) 
basis or a last-in-first-out basis (LIFO). During inflationary periods, the FIFO assumption 
is more faithful to economic reality in the balance sheet (current assets are recorded at 
current levels but current cost of sales are recorded at outdated levels) while the LIFO
assumption is more faithful to economic reality in the income statement (costs are 
recorded at current levels while assets are recorded at outdated levels). 
In which statement should greater faithfulness be promoted?   Most users of 
financial information—as well as accountants, managers and auditors—regard the 
income statement as more useful than the balance sheet.56  If so, when trade-offs arise in 
relative fidelity between the respective statements and economic reality, the alternative 
should be chosen that promotes greater fidelity in the income statement than in the 
balance sheet.57  So a good measure of income should be privileged over a good measure 
of owners’ equity (income statement over the balance sheet).  In inflationary periods, this 
means LIFO should be preferred to FIFO (and this appears reflected in the proportion of 
companies choosing it).  
Ambitious accounting theorists seek a way to enable using LIFO in the income 
statement and FIFO in the balance sheet.  As it exists, GAAP calls for articulation 
between the two reports.  That is, revenues minus expenses equal earnings and this 
amount determines changes in owners’ equity.  So the same method of determining the 
cost of goods sold and inventory must be used in both statements.  Allowing the two to 
bear different measurements (that is, to allow for non-articulation) would improve fidelity 
to economic reality.  But, coming to the point, this does not imply that it would facilitate 
superior valuation exercises.58 Superior accounting is superior numerical history, not 
superior utility for forward-looking valuation exercises.
55 Notice how this is neither a standard nor a rule.  Compare supra Part I.B.
56
 This is the case for going concerns as opposed to business liquidations.
57 Again, the case for going concerns as opposed to business liquidations.
58 The non-articulation view was once supported by the American Accounting 
Association, the professional association of academic accountants.  Permitting non-
articulation between the income statement and balance sheet would presumably call for a 
statement of reconciliation between the two.  
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A related cardinal principle of accounting further illustrates the difficulty 
accounting faces on its own numerical-historical terms.  The concept is conservatism, 
meaning a preference when judgments are close for understanding assets and revenues 
and overstating liabilities and expense.  As between LIFO and FIFO, LIFO may be more 
conservative in both the income statement and the balance sheet for any given period.  
But conservatism in the balance sheet, showing lower ending inventory, entails less 
conservatism in the succeeding period’s income statement, showing lower expenses.59
So accounting faces inherent trade-offs on its own terms, with fundamental concepts such 
as conservatism providing conflicting answers to basic questions.  
This discourse on FIFO-LIFO shows it may be more useful to concentrate on 
accounting’s integrity as numerical history before attempting to position it in more 
ambitious roles.  In the example, using FIFO or LIFO drives different reports of net 
income and assets. The same is true for thousands of accounting questions, which cannot 
be constrained by rules, principles, or fairly-presents requirements.
This prompts a simple (but revolutionary) proposal: to abandon the conceit of 
computing a single number for earnings and a single number for owners’ equity and 
instead report a range of reasonable figures for each.60  This would more fairly reflect the 
fundamental challenges and limits of accounting, a system tied to numbers and history
yet still capable only of providing ranges with any reliability.  Despite these realities, 
demands on accounting increasingly push in opposite bolder directions, as the following 
examples show.
B. Historical Cost or Fair Value?
Debate on the relative utility of the balance sheet versus the income statement,
and their articulation, shows accounting’s historic-numeric orientation.  Associated limits 
appear more fully by considering accounting for fixed assets (those with useful lives 
covering multiple accounting periods).  These are recorded at historical cost (less 
59 This also affects the inventory turnover ratio, a key measure of business performance 
that relates sales to the cost of sales: a company using LIFO rather than FIFO will show, 
other things being equal, speedier inventory turnover.
60
  The proposal’s appeal is invariant to whether a rules- or principles-framework 
dominates, and indeed reinforces the sense that this is a false dichotomy.  Put in those 
terms, a rule is 2 + 2 = 4.  There is no other correct answer to this question, what is 2 + 2.  
A standard may be .33 + .33 + .33 = 1.   The issues in accounting are more fundamental 
than should we keep a rule that says 2 + 2 = 4 or adopt a standard allowing 2 + 2 to equal 
other sums under certain circumstances.  The issue is how to determine whether the 
inputs are 2 and 2 versus 1 and 3.  As the FIFO-LIFO example suggests, a fair answer 
would be we are only certain that the inputs are either 2-and-1 (or in between) or 2-and-3 
(or in between) so that the result fairly ranges from 3 to 5.  This trade-off characterizes 
nearly all accounting exercises.
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accumulated depreciation taken as a periodic expense, for most fixed-assets).  Most 
transactions other than those concerning fixed assets are recorded at fair value (inventory 
is recorded at the lower of cost or market, with cost capturing pretty much current costs 
given that inventory is a current asset).  Should fixed assets be too? 
In periods of changing prices, the historical-cost principle applied to fixed assets 
diminishes the fidelity of reported amounts to current economic reality.  Suppose a 
company bought an acre of land 20 years ago for a cost of $100,000 and a contiguous 
functionally identical acre today for $1 million.61  Its balance sheet would show a total for 
these of $1.1 million (land is not subject to depreciation exercises—a rule).  But the 
figures suggest a total current value for them of $2 million.  The historical cost principle 
thus carries an embedded assumption that currency amounts are a stable unit of 
measurement like gallons, tons, or miles.  This assumption is false whenever average 
price levels change.  
For short periods of relatively stable prices the stable-currency assumption may 
not matter much.  But over short periods with rapidly changing price levels or long 
periods with modest period-to-period changes, the assumption renders comparisons 
difficult.  In the aftermath of the hyper-inflationary period of the 1970s, FASB flirted 
with concepts that would reflect inflationary effects on fixed asset carrying amounts. It
experimented with requiring large entities to report supplementary data concerning the 
effects of inflation on current values and current replacement costs.  The experiment 
revealed that the costs of computing and supplying such data outweighed associated 
benefits and the requirement was repealed.62
Despite this experiment’s failure, advocates of more ambitious goals for 
accounting seek a fair-value approach.63  This fair-value movement favors reporting all 
61 See ROBERT LIBBY, ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING (3rd ed. 2001), at ___.
62 See American Bar Association Securities Regulation Subcommittee on Annual 
Review, Significant 1986 Regulatory and Legislative Developments, 42 BUS. LAW. 827, 
871-72 (1987) (noting 1986 repeal of FASB inflation accounting statement in effect 
during the latter 1970s and adjustments to related SEC rules formerly requiring certain 
large public companies to provide supplementary financial information on the impact of 
inflation).
63 See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair 
Value as the Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839 (1996); see also
G. A. Swanson, Accountability and the Drift Towards ‘Fair Value Measurement’, AM. 
ACCT. ASS’N REGIONAL MEETING PAPER, SSRN ID = 487043 (Apr. 6, 2004); see 
generally FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS 
NO. 7, USING CASH FLOW INFORMATION AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING 
MEASUREMENTS (Feb. 2000).
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assets on the balance sheet at fair value.  The key reason for recording fixed assets at 
historical cost is this provides an objective measure under the monetary transactions 
principle; the key reason not to use fair value is conservatism.  Fair value could be 
reported using appraisals or comparable transactions, but the remaining subjective 
element puts it in tension with the conservatism principle (when in doubt, understate 
assets).  Also the benefit may be modest, since users of balance sheets read them later 
than the balance sheet date and by then fair value may have changed.64
But reporting some assets at historical cost and others at fair value produces a 
total asset figure consisting partly of oranges and partly of apples.65  An alternative 
proposal exhibiting more modesty meets this objection. It asks whether accounting needs
a statement reporting fixed assets at all.66  Suppose a different statement of 
position/condition than the balance sheet, such as a “statement of solvency.”  It would 
show all resources and claims susceptible to objective measure and denominate the 
difference between the two as a measure of solvency (the capacity to meet long term 
obligations when they come due).
Financial statement analysts distinguish liquidity, capacity to meet short-term 
obligations, from solvency, capacity to meet long-term obligations.  Beyond that, 
however, solvency is rarely discussed in accounting literature, though frequently 
analyzed in law.67  A solvency statement would be like a balance sheet in capturing a 
moment in time.  In contrast, it would only report those assets that can be measured at 
fair value.  This would exclude most fixed assets (as well as most intangible assets).  
They can be reported in the notes.68
64
 Limits of using the historical cost principle for fixed assets is another argument for 
income statement supremacy over the balance sheet. On the other hand, given articulation 
between the two, limits on the balance sheet imply limits on the income statement.  
Moreover, examining the concept of accumulated depreciation leads to the same dead-
end.  It can be a useful proxy for required reinvestment.  Reporting fixed assets at fair 
value and tying depreciation expense to that amount would enhance the reliability of 
accumulated depreciation as a proxy. True, depreciation would remain principally a cost-
allocation exercise implementing the matching principle.  But for long-held assets during 
inflationary periods, its utility as a proxy for required reinvestment would improve.  The 
trade-off is between reliability and usefulness: fair values may be more useful but absent 
actual markets where those values are registered they may be less reliable.
65 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 763, 826-834 (1995) [hereinafter, Kitch, Theory and Practice].  
There is nothing wrong with adding apples and oranges but the result is a basket of fruit, 
difficult to compare with other fruit baskets.
66 See ANTHONY, RETHINKING THE RULES, supra note 11, at ch. 3.
67 See id. 
68 See infra Part II.A.1.
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The solvency-statement proposal and fair-value movement straddle existing 
balance sheet norms. In effect, the balance sheet compromises a tension between 
measuring the immeasurable (objective fair-value estimates for fixed assets) and unifying 
what cannot be unified (apples and oranges).  The solvency concept recognizes 
measurement limits by limiting reported asset amounts to those susceptible to objective
measurement. The fair value movement reflects frustration with accounting’s traditional 
orientation towards history, seeking a more current orientation.  This view reflects a more 
general climate of frustration with accounting’s historic-numerical disposition, 
epitomized ultimately by making cash a rival to accrual accounting.
C. Accrual or Cash?
Accounting as natural language and as code uses the accrual system.  This 
allocates economic events to discrete accounting periods based upon a link to underlying 
business activity.  It contrasts with the cash-basis of accounting, which records events 
when cash is exchanged.  The accrual system’s theoretical basis includes the stewardship 
function of accounting information, a fundamentally historical perspective. Financial 
reports should reflect how well managers have operated a business.  The accrual system’s 
key device, the matching principle, pursues this aspiration by insisting that expenses 
burden the income statement in the period they contribute to revenue generation (or 
earlier if this cannot be determined, under the conservatism principle).  
In the past two decades, a separate statement of cash flows has joined the balance 
sheet and income statement as an essential component of a set of general purpose 
financial statements.69 The accrual system obscures cash flows; the cash flow statement 
makes them transparent.  Financial statement analysts and finance theorists increasingly 
focus on cash flows, casting doubt upon the utility of the accrual basis of accounting.  
Consider the following assertion: cash flow is a fact, while earnings are an opinion.  This 
assertion is from the title of an important article by a leading financial economist.70 The 
provocative title implies numerous points, two of which are notable here.
69 FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
(SFAS) 95: STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS ¶ 27 (Nov. 1987); Cunningham, An Essay on 
the True and Fair View, supra note 25 (providing historical perspective).
70
 Pablo Fernández, Cash Flow is a Fact; Net Income is Just an Opinion (Sept. 2002), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=330540. A famous contemporary debate in accounting 
theory evaluates whether valuation according to earnings or cash flows is superior.  
Compare Stephen Penman, On Comparing Cash Flow and Accrual Accounting Models 
for Use in Equity Valuation, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RESEARCH (2001) (the case that 
accounting matters and that accrual-earnings based valuation models are superior to cash 
flow models) with Russell J. Lundholm & Terry O’Keefe, On Comparing Cash Flow and
Accrual Accounting Models for Use in Equity Valuation: A Response to Penman 2001, 18 
CONTEMP. ACCT. RESEARCH (2001) (when applied correctly, valuation models using 
earnings and cash flow should yield identical estimates).
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First, the cash flow statement’s power opens up possibilities for accounting never 
plausible with the balance sheet and income statement alone.  Cash flows are a more 
reliable tool than traditional accounting data drawn from balance sheets and income 
statements in predicting bankruptcy filings under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
and insolvency generally.71 Evidence suggests that the cash flow statement is superior 
compared to the balance sheet for measuring accruals as a way to test for the presence of 
earnings management in the income statement.72 Past cash flows are usually a better 
indicator of future cash flows than are earnings (though predictions can be improved by 
using the two together).  
Second, the leading use of the cash flow statement is a basis for making valuation 
determinations.  And the leading basis for making valuation decisions is cash flow.73  In 
fact, discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation became, in the latter half of the 20th century, 
the dominant valuation method, rendering to history’s dustbins traditional valuation using 
assets or earnings.  Despite resistance through the early 1980s,74 DCF is now routinely 
used to gauge business value.  Institutions ranging from U.S. courts to the World Bank 
endorse DCF valuation methods.75
Two features of valuation emphasizing cash flow stand out. First, what constitutes 
cash flow must be specified.  On a cash flow statement the amounts are usually 
specified—they can be facts—but when analyzing them a wide variety of possibilities 
71 See DIVESH SHANKAR SHARMA & ERROL R. ISELIN, THE DECISION USEFULNESS OF 
REPORTED CASH FLOW AND ACCRUAL INFORMATION IN A BEHAVIORAL FIELD 
EXPERIMENT, available at http://www.ssrn.com.
72 See Gopal V. Krishnan & James A. Largay, The Predictive Ability of Direct Method 
Cash Flow Information, 27 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 215 (2000).
73 See e.g., ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE (2000); RICHARD A. BREALEY & 
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (4th ed. 1991); WILLIAM W. 
BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2002); compare BRUCE 
C.N. GREENWALD, ET AL., VALUE INVESTING (2001) (the case against making discounted 
cash flow analysis the dominant valuation method in favor of emphasizing asset-based 
valuation or earnings-based valuation).
74 Compare Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (abandoning previous 
business valuation framework reliant upon a weighted average of value estimated using 
assets, earnings and market price, in favor of framework permitting all generally 
recognized valuation methods, the ascendant one of which was DCF).  
75 See M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (1999); WORLD BANK,  
REPORT TO THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE AND GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,  Sept. 21, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1363,1379 (1992). 
27
appear.  They all start with GAAP earnings but then exclude or include a host of 
discretionary items.76  Resulting expressions (like EBIT, EBIDTA and so on) are not 
accounting concepts.  They do not appear in accounting’s natural-language history nor in 
its FASB-codifications.77  Rather, these concepts are recent inventions of investment 
bankers and other financiers.78 Using them thus requires narrative evaluation and 
explanation. Second, DCF analysis projects cash flows into the distant future, at least five
years and usually for a horizon period beyond that of 10 to 15 years.79  Popularity of DCF 
thus underlines a shift in accounting information from accounting as numerical history to
accounting as narrative prognosis.
III. NARRATIVE PROGNOSIS AND ITS LIMITS
If you sold 5 widgets last year, it is clearly a lie to report selling 6.  If you say you 
expect to sell 6 widgets next year, it is not clearly a lie to say you hope to sell 7.  This is a 
key difference between accounting as numerical history and accounting as narrative 
prognosis.  The former is about facts; the latter is about hopes and expectations.
Two salient features of the late 1990s bubble were proliferation of analyst 
earnings reports specifying expectations and corporate pro forma reporting expressing 
hopes.  Both phenomena show indulgence of accounting as narrative prognosis, not 
numerical history. Analysts expect certain results, an inherently prospective concept.80
76 Common short-hands include earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), earnings 
before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITD), and earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).  In each case, adjustments are made by 
subtractin g from resulting cash-flow figures estimates of future required reinvestments in 
the business for capital expenditures.
77 In fact, FASB-ordained GAAP prohibits providing cash flow per share figures in a set 
of general purpose financial statements.  See FIN. ACC. STANDARDS BD., RELEASE ___.
78 See H. Erik Lee & Heidi Lee, Multiples Used to Estimate Corporate Value, 58 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. ___ (March/April 2002).
79 See CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR 
LAWYERS, supra note 17, ch. 12 (discussion of valuation techniques, including DCF).
80
 The rise of this analyst function is a significant inimical phenomenon impairing 
accounting’s integrity.  The regulatory response, Regulation FD, went to a different 
perception of the problem: equal access to management.   See D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street 
v. Main Street: The SEC’s New Regulation FD and Its Impact on Market Participants, 77 
IND. L. J. 551 (2002). The real issue is the information to which access is given, which is 
not hard historical numbers but soft future-oriented narration.  It was called “guidance.”  
See infra text accompanying notes ___-___.
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Managers peddling pro forma data understood they were not talking about numerical 
history but offering something else—hope.81
A common feature of accounting fraud is rosy views of the future.  A manager 
believes certain targets can be reached—expecting 6 and hoping for 7.  The future 
reporting of numerical history will be superior—better than 5.  This can create sufficient 
optimism to doctor current pictures of numerical history (call it 6 this year), with a view 
towards the rosier future absorbing the difference between actual history and the 
imagined future (if we in fact sell 5 this year but 7 the year after, call it 6 apiece).82
Moreover, since no actual sales or receivables have been generated, and no inventory 
sold, there are no hard numbers to report, only estimates; and estimates must be 
explained, requiring narrative (we expect to sell 6 because of a new customer and hope to 
sell 7 because of a new manager).
As greater emphasis is placed on the future, the temptation to pursue this course 
increases.  And the closing decade of the 20th century produced wide-scale social 
preoccupation with the future.83  This preoccupation is evident in financial reporting and 
disclosure, in which accounting is the heart.   Along with the rise of discounted-cash-flow 
valuation techniques, manifestations of analyst expectations and pro forma hopes were 
81
 The practice of pro forma financial reporting became widespread in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.  This involved presenting financial data in forms deliberately varying from 
GAAP.  While managers defended these using various obfuscating arguments, including 
that GAAP just didn’t work well for their special business, underlying it was an impulse 
to show how the future would likely look.  It was an attempt to be liberated from GAAP, 
but more because of its inherent qualities as numerical history.  Managers—and 
investors—wanted information bearing more futuristic utility. The misleading 
proliferation of pro forma accounting in the late 1990s spawned a section of Sarbanes-
Oxley cracking down on its proliferation. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 401(b), Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. § 7266.   But as with other reforms, this does 
not really get at the underlying issue concerning the impulse and demand for narrative 
prognosis rather than numerical history. 
82 Cf.  In the Matter of BT Securities Corporation, 58 S.E.C. DOCKET 1145, 1994 SEC 
LEXIS 4041 (Dec., 22 1994), reprinted in LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, ET AL., CORPORATE 
FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE: CASES (2d ed. 1996), at 286.  In this matter, tape recordings 
of a derivatives trader captured him describing how undisclosed losses on a client 
account would be made up when the market moved favorably, as follows:
. . . [T]he real number was 14.  So now if the real number is 16, we’ll tell 
him that it is 11. You know, just slowly chip away at that differential 
between what it really is and what we’re telling him.
83 See Anthony Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1999) 
(contemporary risk management concepts showing increasing social preoccupation with 
the future).
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part of broader changes forced on accounting’s role, both antedating these manifestations 
and—ironically—sustained in reforms made in their wake.
A.  Contemporary Evolution (Pre-Scandal)
Accounting reports have long been accompanied by narrative materials but the 
narrative component expanded dramatically during the latter 20th century.84  In its final 
decades, moreover, the narrative platform became a basis for launching an expanding 
range of forward-looking discussion, making forecasts that revolutionized the nature of 
financial reporting.  These trends reflect and fuel market demand for glimpses into the 
future.
1.  Narration — Information provided in narrative is substantial compared to that 
provided numerically85 Financial statements are accompanied by elaborate narrative 
footnote disclosure explaining the accounting concepts applied and the significance of 
numerical data. Supplementary data often appears, likewise accompanied by substantial 
narrative explanation. Since the 1980s, federal securities laws require narrative 
management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) in addition to numerical presentation of 
accounting information.  Using narrative information reflects both the limits of 
accounting’s traditional numerical bias and demand for such qualitative accounting.  
Numerous judgments enter into producing financial statements.  These judgments 
are disguised by the numerical bottom lines, impressing the numbers with false scientific 
inevitability. Under accounting requiring specific numerical designations (as 
distinguished from the proposal made in Part II to provide a range of numbers),86 their 
meaning must be expressed in narrative.  
Consider how the balance sheet measures various assets according to differing 
metrics: fixed assets at historical cost less accumulated depreciation and other assets at 
fair value—with these subject to various conventions, such as inventory using FIFO or 
LIFO and accounts receivable net of an estimated allowance for doubtful accounts.
84
 Traditional accounting as numerical history contains hints of prognosis.  For example,
estimating bad debt expense associated with generating accounts receivable is
prognostication as a forecast of probable recoveries.  These estimates, however, are 
simultaneously constrained by the conservatism principle.  See supra text accompanying 
note ___.
85 This observation is unexceptional: balance sheets, income statements and cash flow 
statements are each either one or two pages long, while footnotes and management’s 
discussion and analysis in typical annual reports extend for dozens of pages each.
86 See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
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These differences—apples and oranges—must be explained to make the data 
comprehensible for a company and comparable with its peers.87
A key reason for narrative disclosure concerns the relation of the fair presentation 
requirement to GAAP’s capacity, discussed in Part I.  Accounting numeracy may be 
misleading, overall, unless choices are explained.  This is the essence of SEC disclosure 
advice requiring an overall presentation that fairly presents performance and condition in 
all material respects.88  Narrative disclosure often is essential to achieving this result.
This is the case without regard to whether GAAP is living language or code, or whether 
founded upon rules or principles.
Narrative disclosure is also a way to include information not otherwise reported 
on the financial statements.  Examples are endless: loss contingencies such as pending 
litigation and regulatory action, aging of accounts receivables, inventory measurements 
and obsolescence histories, depreciation schedules and so on.89  This is also the approach 
FASB took to its inflation-accounting experiment of the 1980s, flirting with requiring 
supplementary disclosure concerning the effects of inflation on fixed asset carrying 
amounts using narrative to explain methodology.90
The limits of numerical accounting appear in an AICPA proposal for a 
comprehensive model of accounting information disclosure.91 It would go far beyond the 
balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flows, to embrace the kinds of 
87 Suppose Company A and Company B both report total assets of $1 million.  They 
appear similar.  But suppose Company A’s reported assets consist of $900,000 of fixed 
assets (at historical cost less depreciation) plus $100,000 in marketable securities (at fair 
value) while Company B’s consist of the opposite mix.  The total asset figures are 
meaningless.  You need to know the mix.  True, liabilities are typically carried at fair 
value (the present value of the obligation).  But given the obscure asset side, the net 
worth or owners’ equity figure is mythical.  Return on equity is not comparable. 
Individual items are useful, while aggregates are not necessarily. See ANTHONY, 
RETHINKING THE RULES, supra note 12.
88 See supra text accompanying notes ___ to ___.
89 For a broader example, see Jeffrey Uneman, Enhancing Organizational Global 
Hegemony with Narrative Accounting Disclosures: An Early Example, 27 ACCOUNTING 
FORUM 425 (2003) (use of politically-oriented narrative accounting disclosure to enhance 
corporate power versus nation states).
90 See supra text accompanying notes ___ to ___.
91 The AICPA is the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  See EDMOND L. 
JENKINS ET AL., THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF INVESTORS AND CREDITORS (1995) (report 
of an AICPA committee called the Jenkins Committee, after chairman Edmond L. 
Jenkins, then FASB Chairman) [hereinafter, JENKINS COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
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narrative disclosure found in the federal securities laws. Accounting as numerical 
expression, confined to the basic financial statements, is inadequate.  It must be explained 
using words.
An advantage to requiring narrative disclosure is comparative ease of generating 
appropriate directives, whether using principles or rules.  A directive to “describe and 
explain” can be drafted and adopted quickly, compared to a set of principles or rules 
defining how a type of transaction is to be classified, measured and reported.  A good 
recent example concerns off-balance sheet financing.  SEC rules adopted promptly in the 
wake of early 2000’s scandal-revelations require descriptions of these when material.92 It 
would take far more time and elaborate process to specify the circumstances under which 
certain complex transactions need to be accounted for on the balance sheet and their
effects on income.93
A similar narrative approach is used to handle a wide variety of controversial 
accounting matters.  Until mid-2004, FASB generally approached stock options by 
requiring narrative disclosure of their effects on earnings per share, not reported on the 
income statement.94  Until the early 1990s, a similar approach was taken towards retiree 
benefit obligations.95 Managers often prefer the narrative approach to such controversial 
92 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RELEASE NOS. 33-8350; 34-48960; FR-72, 
INTERPRETATION: COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND 
ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS (December 22, 2003).
93 Resort to narrative disclosure likewise rounds out the rough edges of innovative reform 
proposals, including for example the statement of solvency concept discussed above, 
which would leave off the balance sheet most fixed assets as lacking objective-
measurability, and reporting these instead in the notes.  See supra text accompanying 
note ___.
94 See CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, supra note 16, ch. 6; compare FIN. 
ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (SFAS) 148 
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION—TRANSITION AND DISCLOSURE (an 
amendment of Statement No. 123) (requiring, after decades of intense resistance from 
corporate America, recording stock option as an expense on the income statement); but
see HOUSE BILL, THE STOCK OPTION ACCOUNTING REFORM ACT (contemplating blocking 
adoption of this standard).
95 See Kenneth E. Dakdduk & Jules M. Cassel, A Guide to Implementation of Statement 
106 on Employers’ Accounting for Post-retirement Benefits other than Pensions (FASB, 
Aug. 1993; rev. ed. Dec. 98; rev. ed. Sept. 2001); FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (SFAS) 106, EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR 
POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS.
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matters, showing that demand for narrative can arise not only from consumers of 
financial information, but from those who prepare it.96
Demand from external users plays a significant role in generating narrative 
financial reporting.  Traditional accounting’s grammar, using monetary-units, is not 
susceptible to reporting non-financial matters.  Consider the role of employees in firms.  
They are often a major “asset” in a sense (contributing to revenue-generating power); 
they do not appear on the balance sheet because the company does not “own” them.  
Narrative provides information on matters concerning employee training, 
recruitment/retention, investment and know-how.
In the same vein, consider for whom accounting information is prepared.  
Traditional financial statements are for external users, but this broad category tends to 
associate with creditors, shareholders and other commercial parties such as long-term 
customers or suppliers.  Many other constituents claim interests and have informational 
needs not always met by traditional financial statements.  Groups include employees, 
governmental agencies and public policy advocates.  GAAP doesn’t always give these 
consumers information they need and supplemental narrative is a way to compel (or 
volunteer) its production.97
From yet broader policy perspectives, accounting information—in numerical and 
narrative form—coupled with mandatory disclosure, can be understood as seeking to 
promote equity in capital markets.98 In this sense equity means the negation of 
96 Compare Anthony J., Enron End-Runs, supra note 4, at 102 (criticizing arguments 
favoring providing financial information in footnotes rather than in statements themselves 
as follows: 
one must . . . question why various industries continue to fight with such 
vehemence against proposals to require the expensing of stock-based 
compensation if the same degree of transparency is being provided by 
virtue of footnote disclosure. The obvious answer is that the footnotes 
simply do not carry as much weight as the actual numbers in a balance 
sheet or income statement—the numbers on which various computations 
and ratios are often primarily based . . . .
97 A dramatic example is social responsibility audits.  There is no place for these in 
GAAP but they are increasingly popular or demanded. See David Hess, Social Reporting: 
A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 41 
(1999); Lewis D. Solomon, Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held 
Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1625 (1993); see also
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) [hereinafter Williams, Corporate Social 
Transparency].
98 See Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy, THE 
ACCOUNTING REVIEW (January 1988), at 1-22.
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asymmetric information between insiders (management) and outsiders (investors and 
others) and erasure of the differences between informed and uninformed constituents.  
When these conditions exist, the market is fully-informed, and fairness optimized. 
2.  Forward-Looking Emphasis — Narrative disclosure is essential to provide the 
range of information detailed in the preceding section.  Unlike numerical disclosure, 
however, narrative furnishes a convenient platform to launch into forward-looking 
discussion and analysis.  Until the late 1970s, the SEC and federal securities law 
prohibited disclosure of forward-looking information.99 In that period, market appetite 
for forward-looking information intensified.100
Participants pressured the SEC to change its stance.  After substantial resistance, 
the SEC finally relented, allowing forward-looking disclosure.  Thereafter the SEC went 
further, encouraging and sometimes requiring forward-looking information.101  The SEC 
characterizes related disclosure as addressing “trends and uncertainties” in a business.102
This opens up accounting’s historical bias towards narrative prognosis.
Revisiting this debate’s history and terms is useful.  The movement for forward-
looking disclosure occurred at the same time as the movement for greater codification of 
GAAP discussed in Part I.  In the early 1970s, SEC Chief Accountant John Burton, 
among others, challenged the newly-established FASB to improve the quality of 
accounting promulgations while simultaneously pushing for forward-looking 
99 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE OF PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE NO. 5362; EXCHANGE ACT 
RELEASE NO. 9984, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH ) ¶ 79,211 at 
82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973) ("It has been the Commission's longstanding policy generally not 
to permit projections to be included in . . . reports filed with the Commission"); 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, GUIDES FOR DISCLOSURE OF PROJECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE NO. 5992 (1978) 
(authorizing forward-looking disclosure).
100 E.g., Homer Kripke, Can the SEC Make Disclosure Policy Meaningful?, J. PORTFOLIO 
MGMT. (Summer 1976) at 32, 35-37.
101 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION S-K, ITEM 303, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.10(b) (“The Commission encourages the use . . . of management's projections of 
future economic performance that have a reasonable basis and are presented in an 
appropriate format."); id., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (mandating disclosure of "any 
known trends or uncertainties that [management] reasonably expects will have a material 
favorable or unfavorable impact on . . . revenues or income from continuing operations").
102 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION S-K, ITEM 303, 17 C.F.R. §
229.303; see generally Quinton F. Seamons, Requirements and Pitfalls of MD&A 
Disclosure, 25 SEC. REG. L. J. 239 (1997).
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disclosure.103  Although these activists achieved limited success in improving 
accounting’s qualities as numerical history, they unleashed a revolution in financial 
reporting by opening it up to narrative prognosis.104
Opponents of forward-looking disclosure made three key arguments favoring the 
SEC’s traditional stance prohibiting prognostication.105  First, forward-looking statements 
are inherently unreliable and misleading per se.106  No one is clairvoyant, and therefore 
management can be no more clairvoyant than investors or other users of financial reports.  
Second, investors likely would assign undue credence to formal managerial disclosure of 
forward-looking information, despite this inherent unreliability.  Third, forward-looking 
information is susceptible to managerial manipulation to a far greater degree than is hard 
historical fact.  All three objections have proven valid, underscored by the accounting 
frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Supporters of forward-looking disclosure emphasized that all investment 
valuation and related decisions are about the future, a point opponents did not and do not 
dispute.  Disagreement concerned whether managers or investors are better positioned to 
conduct prognostication.  While supporters did not believe either group was clairvoyant, 
they did opine that managers were somehow better equipped than investors to provide 
reasonable forecasts.107  They also redefined the target audience for financial disclosure 
from the average ordinary investor to the sophisticated investor, an effort to negate the 
claim that investors would give undue credence to managerial forecasts.108  Finally, 
manipulation risk could be neutralized by imposing on managers an obligation of good 
faith when providing forward-looking disclosure.109
103 John Burton, Elephants, Flexibility and the Financial Accounting Standards Board , 29 
BUS. LAW. 152 (1974) [hereinafter Burton, Elephants and Flexibility]; see also Homer 
Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1151 (1970) [hereinafter Kripke, Myths and Realities].
104 See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 554-555.
105 See Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulations, 16 
BUS. LAW. 300, 307 (1961) (despite reality that investment value is a function of future 
financial performance, managers are not clairvoyant and management attempts at 
forecasting are “almost invariably . . .  misleading because they suggest to the investor a 
competence and authority which in fact does not exist”).
106 SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 611.
107 See Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note 103.
108 See Burton, Elephants and Flexibility, supra note 103.
109 See Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note 103, at 1198-99.
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The debate’s resolution led to a system requiring more and more forward-looking 
disclosure, with SEC releases in 1979, 1982 and 1989 increasing this orientation.110
Early proponents disagreed as to whether this regime should be voluntary or mandatory; 
the result was initially an experimental regime based on voluntary disclosure that 
gradually moved to one mandating specific kinds of forward-looking disclosure.111  Also 
debated was whether forward-looking information should be targeted at the sophisticated 
investor or all investors. Supporters argued that managers provided forecasts to 
sophisticated investors outside formal SEC filings and that all should be entitled to this 
information.112 While this reality was unchanged through the late 1990s, the SEC then 
adopted Regulation FD to require that any such guidance provided to one investor be 
provided simultaneously to the entire public.113
Regulatory efforts ensuing from this debate thus addressed numerous contentious 
questions.  The resulting regime is mostly mandatory; good faith and reasonable bases are 
required; and all investors—sophisticated and novice alike—are entitled to the same 
predictions. Never resolved in this debate on the merits, however, is the argument of 
opponents that forward-looking information is inherently unreliable.  It remains true, 
after all, that no one is clairvoyant.  The late 1990s and early 2000s also show that even 
so-called sophisticated investors are not immune from being fooled by managerial 
manipulations.  
Accordingly, the SEC’s early cautious regulatory response to market demand for 
futuristic information showed prudence. The reality that forward-looking information is 
inherently unreliable manifested itself immediately.  Managers would forecast various 
business developments for market participants eager to clarify their own cloudy crystal 
balls.  When these judgments turned out differently, plaintiffs’ lawyers sued.  This 
litigation manifested symptoms of the underlying reality that forward-looking 
110 See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 611 (SEC’s 
1982 adoption of Item 303 of Regulation S-K concerning MD&A and forward-looking 
information “is the key part of the evolution of the Commission’s approach to accounting 
from an emphasis on ‘hard fact’ to its present emphasis on ‘soft’ or predictive 
information.  It is a comprehensive disclosure item”).
111 See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 559-561.
112 Compare Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note 103 (objecting to extant practice that 
SEC position perpetuated of “differential disclosure,” meaning professionals receiving 
projections in presentations, conference calls and press releases the public at large did not 
receive) with Burton, Elephants and Flexibility, supra note 103 (urging reorientation of 
SEC target audience from “the investor without clout, if you will” and “sophisticated 
investors and professional analysts through whom information would be filtered down to 
less sophisticated investors and their brokers”).
113 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE AND INSIDER 
TRADING, FINAL RULE: 65 FED. REG. 51,716 (2000).
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information is inherently unreliable.  Rather than ever confronting this reality squarely, 
the regulatory regime focused on these symptoms by designing devices to address 
associated litigation abuses.114
The leading device to address litigation abuses associated with forward-looking 
information is a body of safe harbor provisions that insulate issuers from liability in 
private actions when forward-looking statements are accompanied by cautionary 
language underscoring their basic unreliability.  The SEC, Congress and courts all 
participated in developing related doctrines.115  The judiciary used the so-called 
bespeaks-caution doctrine,116 providing a case-by- case evaluation of whether forward-
looking information was accompanied by sufficient cautionary language to alert a 
reasonable investor to the information’s tentative quality.117
114 See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 13, at 559-560 
(quoting SEC official and leading securities lawyer of the period, A. A. Sommer, as 
saying that litigation aspects were the “biggest headache” associated with the new 
forward-looking disclosure regime).
115 See Securities Act Rule 175 and Exchange Act Rule 3b-6; Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Section 27A of the 1933 Act) and 15 U.S.C. §
78u-5(c) (Section 21E of the 1934 Act).  For a concise summary of the intricate 
provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act addressing the relationship 
between its safe-harbor provisions and the kinds of forward-looking information that are 
required, encouraged, and permitted, see Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Karen Kennard, Greater 
Expectations: Risk Disclosure Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 331, 335-354 (1996).
116 See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993);
Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 
(6th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Ivax Corp ., 182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 1999) (also interpreting 
Congressional and SEC safe harbor provisions); see generally Donald C. Langevoort, 
Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994).
117
 Courts provided varying formulations of the doctrine, though generally they applied to 
both misstatements and omissions, solely to prospective information, with particularized 
cautionary language related directly to the relevant disclosure. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & 
JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 2003), at
1017-20 (summarizing cases and positions by circuit).  In general, however, it is a 
pragmatic application of basic principles of securities law, chiefly designed to balance 
generating useful but contingent information against dangers that issuers could hide 
behind bad news by cloaking it in cautionary garb.  See Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 
164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994).
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While some evidence indicates that the forward-looking disclosure system 
enhanced the overall quality of information and its interpretation,118 drawbacks appear.119
When managers forecast future earnings, and equip analysts to do so and these widely 
disseminate expectations across the market-place, enormous pressure to meet those 
expectations arises.  (When you sold 5 widgets, you created a historical record; when you 
say you expect to sell 6 and hope to sell 7, you have created expectations and hopes.)  
Managers who fail to meet expectations and hopes are punished severely.  This in turn 
increases the pressure to enhance reports of numerical history to conform to the narrative 
prognosis previously painted.120  The result is often snowball accounting: continuing 
pressure to repaint the numerical history to conform to increasingly out-of-reach narrative 
prognosis.
These effects are not met by regulatory efforts to police the litigation fallout from 
prognostication.  More difficult than second-guessing by litigation is the first-order stage 
on which this information is demanded and supplied.  Demand for forward-looking 
information is demand for what is inherently unreliable.  Supplying the information sets 
markers that are bound to result in disappointment.  Specifying the targets creates 
pressure to meet them, and when fundamental business strategies cannot do so, 
accounting massage becomes more tempting.121
118 COFFEE & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 117, at 6 (citing Artyom 
Durnev et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New 
Evidence, PRESENTATION AT THE AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION 
ANNUAL MEETING (May 12, 2001) (examining impact of mandatory forward-looking 
disclosure in MD&A on share prices).
119 See Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV. 477 (1994)
(reviewing history of forward-looking disclosure regime and examining litigation arising 
under it). For a general assessment and prescriptions to reform the forward-looking 
disclosure regime not using safe-harbors but through formal SEC release articulating its 
parameters and furnishing detailed guidance, see Joel Seligman, The SEC’s Unfinished 
Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953 (1995); see also Suzanne J. 
Romajas, Note, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A Look at the 
Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 245 (1993) (providing more optimistic 
assessment).
120 In theory, ex ante awareness of future punishment for disappointed expectations 
should constrain managerial optimism; in practice, this constraint is weak.  See Joseph 
Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 14 
(2002).
121 Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause other Social Harms), 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 101, 126 (1997):
Forward-looking disclosure . . . must often be made with less-than-
complete confidence of their accuracy, with the nagging sense that with 
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Not only has inadequate attention been paid to this feature of the contemporary 
financial reporting environment,122 the safe-harbor mechanisms used to address the 
identified litigation problem appear equally inadequate to their task.  Needed is a tool to 
address both challenges, of constraining undue second-guessing litigation and 
constraining making forecasts that likely engender pressure to report accounting figures 
in light of those estimates rather than subsequent business reality.
One possibility exists in SEC rules.  The rules governing forward-looking safe 
harbors invite auditors to provide assurance with respect to forward-looking information
contained in the MD&A (as well as other information in the MD&A).123 Issuers have not 
more time, doubts about data quality might naturally diminish. From time 
to time, senior executives will discover, much too late, that the truth is 
indeed quite different from what they have been led to believe. To be sure, 
senior executives cannot explicitly acknowledge this. Part of the essential 
dramaturgical role of senior managers is to communicate confidence and 
control over their environment, and . . . many management theorists 
believe that effective corporate disclosure must reflect a comparable level 
of confidence in control, if not performance, by the senior management 
group. Thus, even putting aside the possibility that those top managers 
have their own selfish reasons to distort, there is a substantial risk of a 
mismatch between what they say and what, once a retrospective look at 
what all those in the organization actually knew or sensed is undertaken, 
was "known" by others in the firm.
Mismatch risk poses two challenges: second-guessing litigation, which the securities law 
framework has addressed, and pressure to finesse a match, to which inadequate attention 
appears to be paid.  Compare Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, 
Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. L. REV. 773 (2004) (examining judicial responses to 
disappointed expectations arising from prognosis).
122 Debate concerning the merits of a forward-looking disclosure system was intense in 
the 1970s (see supra notes 103-114 and accompanying text), but thereafter cooled and the 
system’s role in the financial frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s was neglected. 
123
 For example, statutory safe harbors define forward looking statements to mean:
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income 
(including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, 
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for 
future operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or 
services of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any 
such statement contained in a discussion and analysis of financial 
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engaged auditors to perform this service, though auditors are eager and willing to provide 
it.  In fact, the AICPA’s proposal to render narrative information a formal part of 
accounting reports indicated that in addition to financial statements, the AICPA would 
call for the equivalent of the MD&A, including forward-looking information, as a formal 
part of financial accounting.124  Such reliance upon auditors is not likely to be feasible at 
present given diminished public trust in the auditing profession due to the numerous audit 
failures of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  But it could be attractive when that profession 
rebuilds public trust, and could help curtail rosy prognostication by naturally-optimistic 
managers.
Requiring auditors to provide such assurance would not change the inherently 
unreliability of earnings forecasts, however.  A more general alternative to the broad 
regime of forward-looking disclosure appears.  Rather than require, permit, or encourage 
managers to provide forecasts of earnings, the regime could simply require managers to 
disclose material risks of future adversity.125  The purpose of this regime would be to 
provide a basis upon which to permit investors to gauge the degree to which a company’s 
numerical history is useful as a guide to probable future performance.  Inherently 
unreliable estimates of future performance would not be required, permitted or 
encouraged.  
B.  What’s Next?126 (Post-Scandal)
condition by the management or in the results of operations included 
pursuant to the rules and regulations of the commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any 
statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, 
to the extent that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by 
the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other 
items as may be specified by rule or regulation of the commission.
Securities Exchange Act, § 21E(a).  Item E captures auditor attestations of related 
disclosure.
124 JENKINS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 91.
125 See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the Expectations Gap in Investor Protection: 
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1154-56 (2003) 
(prescribing a complete overall of MD&A to provide “what investors really want and 
need [which] is a warning of material future risks  . . . [and] discussion of their 
probability and magnitude from management's perspective . . .”).
126 Pun intended.
40
If recent cultural pressure on accounting moves it from numerical history to 
narrative prognosis, both features of the latter trend are reinforced by recent reforms.  
This shows not only misdiagnose of the disease and questionable prescription, it firmly 
manifests the depth and ubiquity of modern culture’s preoccupation with the future.
1.  Continuous Disclosure System — The apotheosis of this trend is the pressure 
for a continuous disclosure system. This is a concept designed to require real-time 
display of various financial developments.127 Long sought by market participants and 
recently encouraged by the SEC, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act adds force to this movement by 
directing the SEC to adopt rules to hasten the phenomenon.  Under the Act, companies 
must disclose publicly on a "rapid and current basis" all material changes in their 
financial condition or operations, including trends, qualitative information and graphic 
presentations.128
The Act uses the word disclose, disguising a more profound shift in market 
appetite and regulatory philosophy—likewise disguising latent dangers.  The innovation 
of the original federal securities laws was a move to disclosure.  Mandatory disclosure, 
Brandeis famously quipped, is the best disinfectant.129 Current pressures for real-time 
display go beyond disclosure.  They move towards transparency.  
Contemporary calls for heightened transparency across society often appear as 
unbounded virtues.130  But good reasons appear to doubt this proposition.131 Bismarck 
127 See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities 
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985); Dale Arthur Oseterle, The Inexorable March 
Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: Are We 
There Yet?, 20 CARDOZO L REV. 135 (1998); see also Erik D. Prohs, Note, Periodic 
Reporting: A Relic of the Past?, 27 IOWA J. CORP. L. 481 (2002).
128 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 501 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. § 
78o-6.
129 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914), 
at 92 ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.").
130 See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You 
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1996):
Transparency is an eleventh commandment of American life 
generally, not just of financial markets. We insist on open hearings all 
through government; we open up to public scrutiny under the Freedom of 
Information Act the records that elsewhere would be kept confidential; we 
relentlessly pursue the tax returns and business dealings of almost anyone 
seeking high public office. We do all this as part of the public's 
unquestioned (if sometimes exaggerated) "right to know." It comes as no 
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reportedly cautioned: “If you like laws and sausages, you should never watch either one 
being made.”132  The same is true for those who like financial reports.  Consider how 
managers are to develop this continuous information-display.
Companies generate internal daily financial data, such as sales, accounts 
receivable balances and charge-offs, and inventory levels and obsolescence.  These show 
trends.  They can amount, on a temporary basis, to material changes in financial 
condition and operation.  Mandatory display of these is functionally equivalent to 
mandatory transparency of business operations on a daily basis.  It opens for view daily 
financial recording, not periodic financial reporting.
Yet daily changes are not indicative of quarterly or annual aggregates.  This 
information is most useful to managers during an accounting/operating period.  It equips 
them to make course corrections, taking such steps as strengthening sales efforts in 
lagging segments or improving collection practices when receivables charge-offs rise in 
certain customer bases.  The information is useful to redirect trends and to manage the
materiality and direction of financial condition and operation. 
Whether corrections succeed take more than a few days of dashboard data to sort 
out.  Premature disclosure of adverse trends may sustain them, disabling managerial 
redirections. If sales are seen flat in one region, customers in adjacent regions may switch 
to competitor products; if receivables collections are seen slowing among some 
customers, other customers may join them.  Investors are likely better served giving 
management time and leeway to make improvements, not respond to them on a daily 
basis.133
surprise that what is so ubiquitous in our society should affect the financial 
reporting of the country's major businesses.
Professor Lowenstein’s comments addressed the traditional disclosure system, not the 
kind of transparency digitization injects into discourse. Calls for transparency routinely 
are heard concerning business, government, international agencies, military operations, 
diplomatic corps, academia and other organization types.  See RUPESH A. SHAH, DAVID 
F. MURPHY & MALCOLM MCINTOSH, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: CREATING TRUST IN 
ORGANISATIONS: STORIES OF TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE
(2003); Williams, Corporate Social Transparency, supra note 97; see also supra  note 2.
131 For a careful assessment of the appeal and limits of transparency, using the example of 
corporate voting in the mutual fund industry, see Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting 
of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (2003).
132 Quoted in KERMIT L. HALL, ED., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW (2002), 
at vii.
133 E.g., Kitch, Theory and Practice, supra note 65, at 847-861 (general analysis 
concluding with example of how disclosure concerning Caterpillar Inc. subsidiary in 
politically-unstable Brazil could have exacerbated political risks); Jonathan R. Macey & 
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If the new rules under Sarbanes-Oxley only tinker with mandatory continuous 
display, consider a proposal for pure transparency made by a senior SEC official.134 It 
prescribes changing the existing financial reporting environment using two devices: (1) 
requiring companies to report real-time bookkeeping information on publicly-accessible 
Web sites (including real-time journal entries, ledger summaries, monthly aggregations 
and so on) and (2) requiring management to respond publicly to questions concerning this 
information. 
The theory of this substantive transparency (not mere disclosure) is to equip 
investors having requisite interest and resources to perform their own financial statement 
audits of companies, or engage their own auditor to do so.  Apart from numerous other 
practical problems,135 it is doubtful that such deep transparency is in the best interests of 
corporations or investors.136   But the proposal shows the enormous new emphasis placed 
on transparency, not just disclosure. 
2.  Auditing’s New Early Warning System — A parallel transparency urge appears 
in recent auditing reforms.  In traditional financial statement audits, auditors speak as of a 
Geoffrey Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud on the Market 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990) (explaining how managerial withholding of 
information may benefit investors rather than harm them as often assumed).
134 Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the Market’s Dependence on Independence: An 
Alternative to the ‘Independent’ Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 347 
(2004) [hereinafter, Chan, Breaking the Market’s Dependence].  When Mr. Chan’s article 
was published, he was Associate Regional Director, Enforcement, in the SEC’s Midwest 
Regional Office.  (His views, of course, do not necessarily represent those of the SEC.)
135
 As examples: (1) supplied information is raw bookkeeping data and limited 
questionnaire access to management; neither investors nor their auditors have access to a 
company’s system of internal control, audit committees, walk-through exercises, or other 
essential resources used in traditional auditing and (2) the result would require enormous 
investor coordination and/or result in numerous separate investor-audits, generating 
wasteful duplicative costs.
136 See Udo C. Brändle & Jürgen Noll, A Fig Leaf for the Naked Corporation?, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=523102 (2004) (making the specific case 
against utter transparency in corporate financial reporting); see generally Troy A. 
Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities 
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2003) (expressing more general reservations); 
Elizabeth J. Boros, Corporations Online, 19 COMPANY & SEC. L. ___ (2001) (survey of 
100 large Australian companies documents grounds for skepticism as to using corporate 
Web sites to deliver “universal real-time free access to continuous disclosure 
information”).  This concern is wholly apart from protecting proprietary information that 
would necessarily be covered by such a proposal.  See Chan, supra note 134, at 391-92.
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moment in time about financial statements prepared as of a prior date and for a prior 
period, providing hard facts.  These are attestations of numerical history.  Auditors are 
financial archeologists.  They provide three paragraphs of standardized text to express 
unqualified opinions, and offer a few additional sentences in other situations.  
Reforms implemented in mid-2004 vastly expand the auditor’s task, transforming 
it from financial archeologist of numerical history into a financial forecaster addressed to 
narrative prognosis.  The reform requires auditors to test and opine upon a company’s 
internal control over financial reporting.137  The goal is to provide financial statement 
users with information concerning financial statement reliability.  
Though based upon a current examination and providing an opinion about control 
maintenance during a past accounting period, it is quintessentially about the future—the 
auditing standard describes itself as creating an “early warning system.”138  The early 
warnings are to be provided using elaborate narrative disclosure provided by the auditor.   
When no warning is required, the standard form of auditor opinion on control will be akin 
to the standard three boilerplate paragraphs of the traditional auditor opinion on financial 
statements; in other situations, the vehicle will go well beyond a few additional 
sentences.
The key trigger requiring auditor forward-looking narrative disclosure is the 
existence of a material weakness in such control.  The concept of material weakness is 
forward-looking, defined as risk that material misstatements will not be detected or 
prevented.  The auditing standard requires auditors to describe material weaknesses along 
with their actual or potential future effects on the company’s financial statements.
The control audit promotes transparency in the financial reporting process.  It may 
be useful as an antidote to widespread preoccupation with the future seen creating 
demand and supply for phony financial futures.  On the other hand, its likely 
effectiveness must be evaluated by comparison to the kindred system of forward-looking 
disclosure in place for business substance since the 1980s.  At a minimum, to make this 
system meaningful likely will require the same kinds of safe harbor concepts developed 
for the forward-looking disclosure system.139 Even those, of course, produced 
imperfections in the relation between forward narrative and eventual reporting of 
numerical history.  Analogous challenges appear in this control audit innovation.
137 PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), AUDITING STANDARD 
NO. 2: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (March 9, 2004) [hereinafter 
AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2]. 
138 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, supra note 137, ¶ 6.
139 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System: 
Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L. J. ___ 
(forthcoming 2004).
44
C. Finance Theory’s Role
The evolution of accounting from numerical history to narrative prognosis is 
visibly driven by market demand; less visible is the force of theory.  The most powerful 
theory driving accounting’s world in the past thirty years is modern finance theory.   Its 
key concept is the efficient market hypothesis.  Under it, all historical information, 
including accounting data, is rapidly impounded into stock price.140 Moreover, under this 
hypothesis, all publicly-available information is accurately interpreted no matter how or 
where it is presented.  These hypotheses—widely believed—imply that any effort to 
improve accounting theory or practice is meaningless.  Finance theory’s contribution to 
accounting is thus its retardation.141
First, efficiency theory says the form of presenting accounting information does 
not matter.  If so, there is no point searching for an ideal form.  If identical data can be 
put in the balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement, footnotes, or MD&A and 
generate the same interpretation and result on price, promoting accounting quality is 
valueless.  The disincentives to develop superior accounting are enormous.142
Second, efficiency theory says accounting information is instantly useless.
Struggles become moot about fidelity in the balance sheet or income statement, about 
FIFO versus LIFO, about historical cost versus fair value or accrual versus cash.  It even 
would moot—extraordinarily—questions about whether to account for stock options as 
an expense on the income statement!143
140 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (still the leading statement by leading corporate law scholars 
on market efficiency despite many critiques).
141 Cf. Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 51 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925 (1994).
142 Cf. Thomas A. Downes & Thomas R. Dyckman, A Critical Look at the Efficient 
Market Empirical Research Literature as it Relates to Accounting Information, 48 ACCT. 
REV. 300 (1973).
143 A leading columnist for the Wall Street Journal argues that it doesn't matter whether 
one accounts for stock options or not, for the market will figure out their significance 
without regard to accounting. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Much Ado About Stock Options, 
WALL ST. J.,  Apr. 3, 2002, at A23:
In the real world [sic], any information, as long as it's deemed relevant, 
will be processed into the mill for pricing securities. It doesn't matter 
whether the data is computed into the income statement or appears in a 
footnote or is shouted up and down Wall Street by a man in a tutu. 
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Third, efficiency theory says market price responds to cash flow effects of 
managerial decisions and policy, not to the effect on reported earnings per share.  
Companies should therefore never seek to manage earnings; investors see through it.  If 
so, accounting need not develop tools to discourage or detect such massage.144  It won’t 
happen.145
Efficiency theory is presentiation.146  Presentiate is "[t]o make or render present in 
place or time; to cause to be perceived or realized as present."147 In efficiency theory, all 
numerical history is absorbed into current stock price and becomes instantly irrelevant; 
all that matters is the future and this too gets “discounted” into price.  This model of 
presentiation is theology.  Yet its enormous power has retarded accounting as numerical 
history and reoriented financial reporting to a forward-looking, less reliable, fraud-
tempting emphasis on narrative prognosis.   
Finance has thus been the foe of accounting, at least as traditional numerical 
history.  Part II’s examples of the fair-value movement and cash-flow elevation are 
products of finance theory’s force. On the other hand, despite finance theory’s 
predictions, managers do manipulate accounting forms and markets are fooled.148 A 
144 See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 
813, 819 (2003) (“Under efficient market analysis, no regulation of accounting is 
needed”).
145 E.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 73, at 372 (“there are no financial illusions”).
146 The chief contribution of this concept to legal literature was made in respect of 
criticism of the classical theory of contracts which appeared to hold a conceit that 
contract formation achieved the reduction of future events to present control.  See Ian R. 
Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 
(1974).  Professor Macneil explained the concept: 
Presentiation is a way of looking at things in which a person perceives the 
effect of the future on the present. It is a recognition that the course of the 
future is so unalterably bound by present conditions that the future has 
been brought effectively into the present so that it may be dealt with just 
as if it were in fact the present. Thus, the presentiation of a transaction 
involves restricting its expected future effects to those defined in the 
present, i.e., at the inception of the transaction.
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 863 
(1978) (footnote omitted).
147 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1306 (1933).
148 A dramatic large-scale example is the tele-com industry’s capitalizing of line costs that 
kept their stock prices high; they plummeted when it became clear these should have 
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burgeoning literature drawing upon behavioral finance undercuts modern finance theory
and explains why.149  A key concept is frame dependence, a bias to apprehend 
information differently according to how it is presented.  The relation to accounting 
forms is clear.  It can matter whether stock options are listed as expenses in the income 
statement or included in footnote disclosure.150   Attention to accounting as numerical 
history remains important and its transformation into narrative prognosis not the 
inexorable march of progress.
The difficulty with behavioral challenges to efficiency theory is their inherent 
messiness, contrasted with the elegant beauty of efficient markets. Behavioral theories 
explain a wide range of often conflicting biases whereas efficiency theory assumes a 
market behaving as if all actors were purely rational.  In fact, however, both accounts of 
market behavior may be partially correct, producing a middle ground.  
Markets may be substantially efficient, but prone to periodic bouts of moodiness 
better captured by behavioral theories.  Such bouts appear to have characterized the late 
1990s and early 2000s and their associated financial frauds.151 If so, this experience
suggests that accounting forms matter most when they are least likely to be obeyed. 
Numerical history is thus particularly important during innovative periods such as the late 
been expensed.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy 
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) 
(providing description of the largest frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s, including in 
the tele-com industry).  Another example is how investors responded to different 
accounting for acquisitions under the now-repealed purchase-pooling distinction.  See
Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston & Michael F. Peters, Purchase, Pooling and 
Equity Analysts’ Valuation, ACCOUNTING REVIEW (July 2000).
149 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear 
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 
(1994) (critique of efficient market hypothesis using chaos theory and noise theory); 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 767 (2002) (critique of efficient market hypothesis using noise theory and 
prospect theory).
150
 Numerous other examples appear.  Consider America-On-Line’s (AOL’s) decision 
whether to capitalize or expense disbursements to build its Internet subscriber data base.  
AOL capitalized these; the market price reflected this; when AOL changed under 
pressure to expense these costs, the market price reflected the change.  Consider the 
general practice in the tele-com industry of treating capacity swaps as asset and revenue 
transactions rather than as liability and expense transactions.  See supra note 148.
151 See ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2002); see also ANDREI SCHLEIFER, 
INEFFICIENT MARKET S (2001).
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1990s and early 2000s when market appetites for narrative prognosis peak.  In this 
middle ground, reliable accounting is a central piston in the efficient market engine.152
CONCLUSION
Accounting is best when conceived as numerical history, though even this 
conception faces limits.  So conceived, a mix of rules and principles constituting 
generally accepted accounting practice furnishes a fair presentation of historical financial 
performance resulting in a current financial circumstance.  Attempting to move the 
numerical system to provide information of a forward-looking character is formidable.  
Narrative is essential.  Narration can be even more limited, however, when used as
prognostication. Forward-looking information is inherently more likely to disappoint than 
historical data.  In the best of worlds, the latter is what it is, while the former is what 
people’s expectations and hopes determine it to mean.  
The digitized-information age demands from accounting what it cannot reliably 
deliver.  Debates focusing on rules versus principles or GAAP versus fair presentations 
miss these points. Reforms directed towards enhancing the orientation toward the future 
not only miss the points but exacerbate what they miss.  Accounting must walk before it 
can run.  Inherent limits suggest at most capacity for a rapid crawl.  The horse is out of 
the gate, however, not to be yoked; the challenge is to look forward in accounting reform 
as much as market demand looks forward in its appetite for information obscured in 
cloudy crystal balls.  One solution is to curtail the scope of forward-looking disclosure, 
replacing earnings forecasts with warnings of material risks of adverse developments.
This Article does not end on a false dichotomy but appreciates the need for 
accounting as both numerical history and narrative prognosis.153  It warns, however, that 
the optimal mix likely weighs more heavily on its qualities as numerical history than 
narrative prognosis.  One lesson from late 1990s/early 2000’s accounting frauds is the 
balance tipped the wrong way.  Feeding the beast of digitized and information-hungry 
culture must be accompanied with training it.154 Mankind has long dreamt of knowing 
152 See Calvin Johnson, Accounting in Favor of Investors, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 637 
(1997).
153 See supra note 84 (noting role of prognosis in traditional accounting as numerical 
history).
154
  It is ironic that digitization poses such challenges for accounting understood as 
numerical history. After all, digitization is the process of transforming information 
(including narrative and graphic displays) into codes expressed in numbers (0 and 1) to 
facilitate computer processing and electronic transfer.  Words-into-numbers sounds like 
accounting; for accounting, however, digitization resulted in numbers-into-words.
Compare Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Valuation: Geography and Semiotics, 55 SMU L. 
REV. 197, 224 (2002) (meditation on ascendancy of numbers over letters amid 
digitization).
48
tomorrow’s news today and digitized culture whets that appetite because it seems so 
much more within reach. In accounting and securities regulation, however, hunger for 
tomorrow’s news today can be perilous.155  Caveat culture.
155 Cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (insider trading conviction arising
from Wall Street Journal columnist privately and criminally sharing tomorrow’s news 
today).
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